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ARE THERE LIMITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE? RAWLS ON COMPREHENSIVE
DOCTRINES, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS, AND THE BASIS OF
EQUALITY
Charles A. Kelbley*
Does a proper understanding of Rawls's idea of "constitutional
essentials" require us to say that certain rights and liberties must be
a part of our Constitution? Does that same idea also mean that
essential features of our present Constitution may not be removed
by means of the amending power of Article V? Are there no
circumstances in which constitutional change can reasonably
embrace the repeal of constitutional essentials? Does Rawls commit
us to a form of constitutional essentialism that is based on nothing
more than our long-standing traditions and practices? And must the
Supreme Court declare a properly ratified amendment to the
Constitution invalid if it is inconsistent with constitutional essentials
or long-standing traditions and practices? These are among the
central questions this Article addresses. First, however, is the
question of the nature and extent of Rawls's influence on the law.
INTRODUCTION
It may be true that the Supreme Court has yet to cite John Rawls's
work on justice in its formal opinions,' but that proves nothing about
the lack of Rawls's influence on American constitutional discourse.2
Rawls's influence on the law has been much more general than
specific, much more indirect than direct, and much more a matter of
questioning than providing the Justices with ready-made conclusions.'
* Department of Philosophy, Fordham University.
1. See Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law,
in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 394 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). "As of July
4, 1999, a database check showed that no opinion filed by a member of [the Supreme]
Court had ever mentioned the name of the philosopher John Rawls." Id. at 408. But
see Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 549, 550
n.8 (1994) (listing representative lower federal court and state court cases citing
Rawls's A Theory of Justice).
2. Michelman, supra note 1, at 408.
3. For a cogent assessment of Rawls's influence, see Thomas Nagel, The
Rigorous Compassion of John Rawls: Justice, Justice, Shalt Thou Pursue, New
Republic, Oct. 25, 1999, at 36.
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The evidence for Rawls's intellectual and indirect influence is
nevertheless abundant. For over thirty years his work has been a
dominant presence in undergraduate and graduate syllabi of diverse
departments of the universities, including, of course, law schools.
Above all, his work has contributed a massive fund of challenging
ideas to the ongoing task of rethinking the foundations of justice. In
the United States, Rawls has surely given renewed life and meaning to
the Constitution's Preamble. A Theory of Justice,4 ("Theory") with its
famous ideas of "justice as fairness"5 and the "original position"6
provides a profound model of how We the People might better
establish justice. Similarly, Political Liberalism,7 with its notion of an
"overlapping consensus" on a freestanding conception of justice, does
much the same for the Preamble's aim of forming "a more perfect
Union" and ensuring "domestic Tranquility."'  There can be no
serious doubt that Rawls's work has had a profound and continuing
influence on American and many other nations' reflections on how to
establish or reform our institutions and their underlying principles of
justice and law.
Prior to 1971, when Theory was first published, Americans arguably
shared a more historical and static outlook on those fundamental
notions in the Preamble: The "Union" was already formed and justice
was established. To the extent that this is so presently, perhaps it is
simply a familiar reflection of how ideas and practices tend to become
calcified for long periods of time within an ongoing status quo,
awaiting eventual re-examination and renewed challenge from
unknown persons at unpredictable times. In part, Rawls's genius, we
might well say, was to provide us with the means for seeing how moral
theory, and later political theory, could put the founding purposes of
As is always the case with philosophy, Rawls's direct influence is almost
entirely intellectual. Even political philosophy, when it has an impact on the
world, affects the world only indirectly, through the gradual penetration,
usually over generations, of questions and arguments from abstruse
theoretical writings into the consciousness and the habits of thought of
educated persons, and from there into political and legal argument, and
eventually into the structure of alternatives among which political and
practical choices are actually made.
Id. at 36-37.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999).
5. Id. §§ 1-9.
6. Id. §§ 20-30.
7. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (2d ed. 1996). All references to this work will
be to the paperback edition of 1996, which includes a new Introduction. Apart from
the two Introductions, the pagination of the paperback edition is the same as in the
original 1993 edition.
8. "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
U.S. Const. pmbl.
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the Constitution's Preamble in a new light, revealing some of the
imperfections in the ways the basic structures of a constitutional
democracy have been honoring or failing to honor those purposes.9
This Article explores a number of themes in both Rawls's early and
later work, demonstrating how those themes contribute to the overall
model of a revised understanding of a constitutional democracy, such
as our own, and how they impact or could impact on specific features
of our constitutional law-not directly, but as norms that might and
perhaps should be adopted. The Article first focuses on what is
arguably the overarching theme of Rawls's later work, the crucial
distinction between comprehensive doctrines of a moral,
philosophical, or religious nature on the one hand, and the contrasting
freestanding political conception of justice that is independent of
comprehensive doctrines, on the other.10
Part I explores this distinction between comprehensive doctrines
and a purely political conception of justice. One reason for focusing
on this distinction is that Rawls's concept of a comprehensive doctrine
is crucial to the evaluation of possible constitutional amendments that
incorporate values beyond the limits of a political conception of
justice, which is part of the subject of Part II. Part I also discusses
some contemporary examples of the distinction and the bearing they
may have on constitutional law. Among other things, Part I suggests
that the incidence of conflicts between comprehensive doctrines and
law or justice is almost a daily occurrence in one or another part of the
world.
The second half of Part I takes Rawls's evaluation of the limited
role of comprehensive doctrines in a constitutional democracy and
compares his position on that role with the way in which the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights ("U.N. Commission") went
about drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Declaration, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, inaugurated the
human rights era." In drawing up the list of human rights, the U.N.
Commission implicitly embraced a distinction very similar to Rawls's
contrast between comprehensive doctrines and a freestanding
conception of political justice. This discussion defends Rawls's idea
9. See William F. Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution ix (1993) ("To
theorize is to see-deeply, comprehensively, apprehending the connections among
things. Every serious student of political theory is reminded ... that the Greek source
of the word theory means 'the act of seeing.').
10. See generally Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7.
11. Another Panel within this Conference on Rawls and the Law deals with the
subject of Rawls and Human Rights. My discussion does not directly impact on
Rawls's theory of human rights, as found in his book, The Law of Peoples (1999). My
purpose is limited to the aim of comparing the theme of comprehensive doctrines in
Political Liberalism with the rationale of the Human Rights Commission in its
approach to drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I take no position
on Rawls's extension of "justice as fairness" to the international context.
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that the aim of a political conception of justice is not truth but what is
reasonable 12 by analogizing it to the methods employed by the U.N.
Commission in its effort to draft a document purporting to define a
universal statement on human rights.
Part II relates the ideas of comprehensive doctrines, freestanding
political conceptions, and human rights to Rawls's controversial
position on the limits of the Constitution's Article V amendment
provisions. The main question is whether the Supreme Court must
accept as valid an amendment repealing core freedoms of the Bill of
Rights, such as those contained in the First Amendment, or one
repealing the equal protection of persons that is set forth in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3  Rawls's negative answer-that the
Supreme Court should not find such amendments valid-does not
flow from a commitment to a comprehensive doctrine, which would
scarcely be consistent with his overall view of a political conception of
justice. On the contrary, his answer arguably requires us to consider
the central importance of his revised explanation of the basis of
equality (which is the subject of Part III). There is, of course,
extensive disagreement about the Court's duty in regard to such
amendments, and Part II surveys a range of positions on both sides of
the issue. In a way, that issue poses a question about the outer limits
of constitutional change, even whether there are in fact any such
limits. Does Article V permit a more or less complete reversal of our
constitutional traditions and principles? Or are there "constitutional
essentials" and therefore substantive limits imposed on valid
constitutional amendments? If the answer to the last question is
affirmative, then it would appear that Rawls's theory may be at
bottom a form of constitutional essentialism, which raises the further
question of whether that is consistent with the plain meaning of
Article V.
Part III reviews Rawls's two views of the basis of equality and
assesses the relevance of these views to his claim that certain
amendments are unconstitutional and must be declared invalid by the
Supreme Court. Whereas Theory had located the basis of equality in
a minimalist theory of natural rights, which arguably did form part of
a comprehensive doctrine, in Political Liberalism Rawls presents a
markedly different foundation of equality, one that aims to be purely
political. 4  This raises several questions: If a valid constitutional
amendment could repeal religious freedom or equality, would that
entail the abandonment of the freestanding political conception of
justice as well as the norm of reasonable comprehensive doctrines?
Would it, in other words, introduce and inaugurate an "unreasonable
comprehensive doctrine" that is wholly at odds with political justice?
12. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 94.
13. See U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV.
14. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7.
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Would our constitutional democracy then become an instance of what
Rawls later called, in The Law of Peoples, an "outlaw state"?15 And
finally, to return to the question that prompts this inquiry, must the
Supreme Court reject such amendments as invalid? To multiply the
perspectives on the nature of the Court's approaches to answering
that question, Part IV conjures up several possible scenarios that may
be supported by one or more of the Justices.
Finally, Part V proposes a way of mitigating the seemingly
irreconcilable positions of those who, like Rawls, claim that the
Supreme Court must declare invalid an amendment repealing core
constitutional freedoms, and those who claim that the Court should
abstain from making such a decision. In part, this mitigation depends
less on theoretical or normative considerations than on natural and
social contingencies surrounding proposed amendments. It is
suggested that the resources for achieving this reconciliation can be
found in Rawlsian theory itself.
I. COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES
A. Comprehensive Doctrines and Political Liberalism
This part briefly explores a few central aspects of the relationship
between comprehensive doctrines and political liberalism. 6 The
underlying aim is to suggest the bearings that this relationship has or
could have on the law. Although the relationship between
comprehensive doctrines and political liberalism is not one of the
more formal "constitutional essentials" that Rawls elaborates in
Political Liberalism,7 it is certainly one of the most essential
characteristics of Rawls's mature understanding of justice as fairness
as well as indispensable to the flourishing of a constitutional
democracy on the model of political liberalism."i Without this
distinction, Rawls's thesis in Political Liberalism simply would not
make sense.
Rawls's political conception of justice necessarily distances itself
from comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines, of a religious, moral,
15. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 90 n.1 (1999).
16. My purpose in this part is to set forth Rawls's rationale for the concept of
comprehensive doctrines without engaging in critical analysis of its tenability. Some
of the presentations by members of the panel on "The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited" expressed criticism of Rawls's concept of comprehensive doctrines. See,
e.g., Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Justifications, 72 Fordham L. Rev.
2021 (2004); Abner S. Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion
Clauses, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2089 (2004).
17. For discussion of the idea of "constitutional essentials," see, for example,
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 227-30.
18. See id. at xxxviii. Rawls says that the ideas of the domain of the political and a
political conception of justice, as distinct from comprehensive doctrines, are "among
the most crucial ideas of political liberalism." Id.
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or philosophical nature, are more or less comprehensive insofar as
they embrace positions on all values, or at least on a wide spectrum of
values. 9 Various religions, philosophies, and moral theories are
standard examples of comprehensive doctrines. The problem
comprehensive doctrines present for political liberalism, however,
arises precisely from the fact that there are a great many of them and
even more from the crucial fact that they are incompatible and
conflict with one another in fundamental ways. Consequently, the
transformed version of justice as fairness in Political Liberalism urges
and argues that an impartial conception of justice cannot be founded
on a particular comprehensive doctrine, as Rawls says was the case, in
certain respects, even in Theory.2" Thus Rawls's revised theory of
justice seeks to be freestanding, which would mean that it is
independent of all reliance on comprehensive doctrines, the proper
habitat of which is the "background culture" of civil society.21 Rawls
says that this background culture "is the culture of the social, not of
the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associations:
churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs
and teams, to mention a few."22 Thus, Rawls seeks to raise his theory
to the realm of political culture rather than remain within the more
common social culture.
This way of looking at comprehensive doctrines might seem to
render them wholly irrelevant to the core of political liberalism, for
the principles and content of Rawls's political theory of justice are
elaborated entirely independent of such doctrines. That, of course,
accounts for the uniqueness of Rawls's political liberalism, for past
theories of justice were wedded, in one way or another, to
comprehensive doctrines as their material source. Yet this is a
mistaken assessment of the role of comprehensive doctrines in
Rawls's thought. In fact, there is an intimate and necessary
relationship between comprehensive doctrines and Rawls's theory of
political liberalism.
If there were no comprehensive doctrines at all, which is difficult
even to imagine, political liberalism would be superfluous, even
meaningless. We must remember that political liberalism owes its
very origin in great part to the plurality of incompatible
19. See id. at 4 n.4 ("A comprehensive doctrine.., is distinct from a political
conception of justice, since it applies to all subjects and its virtues cover all parts of
life." (emphasis added)). Rawls makes an important qualification to this
characterization by noting that some comprehensive doctrines are incompletely or
"partially comprehensive." Id. at 175. Rawls also supposes that "the comprehensive
doctrines of most people are not fully comprehensive, and this allows scope for the
development of an independent allegiance to the political conception that helps to
bring about a consensus." Id. at 168.
20. Id. at xlii.
21. Id. at 14 (internal quotations omitted).
22. Id.
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comprehensive doctrines and the absence of any moral authority to
pronounce one of them as true.2 1 Moreover, there is the great
practical necessity of achieving the sought after "overlapping
consensus" on Rawls's freestanding conception of justice. Without
comprehensive doctrines, that consensus would have no place or
perspective from which to emerge; there would be no overlapping
consensus necessary, for by hypothesis, no differences in values and
beliefs would exist. But if there are no comprehensive doctrines, this
would contradict the obvious fact of pluralism on matters religious,
moral, and philosophical, which was the original motivation for
Rawls's attempt to transform his theory of justice into a freestanding
conception. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind that for Rawls,
the choice of the freestanding political conception is made from some
content-rich perspective, which is the perspective of individuals and
groups divided by their commitment to comprehensive doctrines.24
Rawls did not make explicit use of the idea of a comprehensive
doctrine until well after Theory was published.25 Key essays in the
1980s touched on the "serious problem" with Theory that Rawls came
to acknowledge and which Political Liberalism was meant to resolve. 26
What was this "serious problem" that Rawls saw in his earlier and
justly famous work on justice? The short answer is that Rawls came
to see Theory as being attached to a comprehensive doctrine, one
among many such doctrines. This brought into question the
"stability" of justice as fairness, which I shall attempt to explain.
Anyone familiar with Theory may be puzzled by the idea that it
could be thought of as dependent upon a comprehensive doctrine, i.e.,
a doctrine that could not be shared by all because many persons are
actually committed to competing and incompatible comprehensive
doctrines. After all, Theory seemed to be freestanding in many
important respects. Its device of the "original position"27 enabled
those occupying that hypothetical stance to deliberate about the
principles of justice free of their biases of class, gender, race, religion,
and the like. The original position device made vivid to them (and to
us) the stringent demands of justice, which merited the designation of
"justice as fairness" because it put those deliberators (you and me)
behind a "veil of ignorance" that shielded us from awareness of our
23. Id. at 97 ("[G]iven the fact of reasonable pluralism, citizens cannot agree on
any moral authority .... ).
24. See, e.g., id. at 168-69.
25. That the idea of comprehensive doctrines was, in important respects, at least
implicit in Theory can be seen within the central concepts of justice as fairness and the
original position, the latter being a device to eliminate knowledge of persons'
comprehensive commitments so that they may not be drawn upon when making the
choice of principles of justice.
26. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at xvii-xix. For Rawls's
discussion of his work leading up to Political Liberalism, see id. at xv-xx.
27. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, §§ 20-30, at 102-05.
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particular commitments of a philosophical, moral, or religious
nature-precisely the kind of commitments that result from
adherence to comprehensive doctrines. Moreover, the original
position forced us to choose for everyone, as there was no way in
which we could tailor the principles of justice to accommodate our
own proclivities and biases. 8
In what sense, then, was Theory itself a comprehensive doctrine
among many others? In Part III of Theory Rawls raised the question
of the stability of justice as fairness. By the term "stability" Rawls was
referring to the capacity of his theory to win support and remain
stable over time, which is certainly an important consideration. For
no matter how elegant a theory of justice may be, if it is not congruent
with stability it is bound to be defective.29
The "serious problem"3 that Rawls later saw in his account of
stability in Theory concerned his linking justice as fairness to a
comprehensive doctrine that embraced a number of values on the
basis of which all citizens (or so he then thought) could endorse his
conception of justice and live their lives in commitment to it. Based
on those values, all citizens would see justice as fairness as constituting
a well-ordered society.31 But, as Rawls came to realize,
[t]he fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible
comprehensive doctrines-the fact of reasonable pluralism-shows
that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice
as fairness is unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with
realizing its own principles under the best of foreseeable
conditions.32
What were the values that constituted the comprehensive doctrine
in which Theory was embedded? Many of the topics in Part III of
Theory could be cited as constitutive elements of the comprehensive
doctrine that was inimical to the achievement of the political
conception of justice that he proposed in Political Liberalism. For
example, his account of stability itself invoked the work of J.S. Mill; 3
the account of moral autonomy was laced with Kantian themes,34 as
was his discussion of the concept of human sociality and social union.35
The presence of these and other characteristics in Rawls's account of
the stability of justice as fairness therefore constituted a dependence
on a comprehensive doctrine that not all persons could be expected to
share. For example, his account of moral autonomy will likely be
28. Id.
29. Id. § 2, at 6.
30. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at xviii.
31. Id.
32. Id. at xix.
33. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 76, at 439-40.
34. Id. § 44, at 251-58.
35. Id. § 79, at 459 n.4.
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unacceptable to those persons who are committed to a comprehensive
religious or moral doctrine that rejects moral autonomy as a value.36
But one should not draw from this the conclusion that Rawls's
substantive theory of justice has undergone dramatic changes in
Political Liberalism. Removing the inconsistency in his account of
stability in Theory still allowed him to "take the structure and content
of Theory to remain substantially the same."37
Thus, while it is certainly true that Rawls's critique of
comprehensive doctrines entailed a major change in his thought, the
core of his theory remained intact. One might simply say that the
form of his theory changed whereas the substance did not.
B. Comprehensive Doctrines in Contemporary Controversies
The "serious problem" that Rawls saw in Theory has analogues in
several contemporary controversies. A very brief sketch of them will
further illustrate the significance and extent of Rawls's distinction
between comprehensive doctrines and a political conception of justice.
1. The Ten Commandments Controversy
The recent controversy over the presence of a display of the Ten
Commandments in the Alabama Supreme Court implicates at least a
partially comprehensive religious doctrine at the heart of the matter. 8
The central question is whether the state of Alabama, in allowing the
Ten Commandments to be displayed in a public place, violates the
Establishment Clause39 by giving tacit approval and recognition to a
conventional religious symbol that figures in one or another
comprehensive religious doctrine. In the language of constitutional
law, does the state thereby violate the "wall of separation" between
church and state?40
I have no intention to try to answer that question here. But I do
want to suggest that a freestanding conception of justice in Rawls's
sense may well preclude allowing the display of the Ten
Commandments in public places, such as the Alabama Supreme
Court. The argument for exclusion would be based on the principle
that any religious content that is allowed to figure in the public
36. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at xlv ("Many citizens of faith
reject moral autonomy as part of their way of life.").
37. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at xviii.
38. See Alabama Justices Order Ten Commandments Removed, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 2003, at Al; see also Jeffrey Gettleman, He'd Do It Again, Says the 'Ten
Commandments Judge,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2003, at A18.
39. U.S. Const. amend. I.
40. For a critical appraisal of the historical basis of the separation of church and
state, see, for example, Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 38 (2002)
(arguing that the separation of church and state doctrine in constitutional law does
not have historical roots in the First Amendment).
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commitments of the state necessarily implicates the elements of a
comprehensive doctrine that is unacceptable to many people who do
not believe in the Ten Commandments for whatever reason. A
commitment by the state to a comprehensive doctrine constitutes an
impediment to securing an overlapping consensus on a political
conception of justice from adherents to comprehensive doctrines in
which the Ten Commandments simply have no place.4'
2. The Gay-Rights Controversy
A second example of a comprehensive doctrine entering the public
sphere of justice concerns the dispute over granting equal rights to
homosexuals, including the right to marry. Part II discusses the merits
of a proposed constitutional amendment to define marriage as a union
of a man and a woman, which would wholly preclude the right to
same-sex marriage. This section, however, pursues more limited aims
by very briefly commenting on a recent Vatican document opposing
same-sex rights42 and then discussing Justice Antonin Scalia's
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court's gay rights decision,
Lawrence v. Texas.43
The Vatican's statement in the Considerations document is a
paradigmatic example of a comprehensive doctrine. Its opposition to
same-sex unions is firmly based on multiple sources, including a
theory of natural law, divine revelation, and church teachings and
encyclicals on the nature of Christian marriage. Although addressed
to the public, it argues from within the framework of Catholic moral
and social doctrine. It claims to express the natural moral truth about
marriage in its opposition to the approval or legalization of same-sex
unions. Rawls's conception of political justice would not question the
truth claims of the Vatican's position, for Rawls's concern is to
formulate a politically freestanding theory on which all reasonable
comprehensive doctrines can agree from the perspective of their own
doctrines.'
41. A similar question is posed by the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance, a question which the Supreme Court will address in a case to be argued in
the 2003 term. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case on 'Under
God' in Pledge to Flag, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2003, at Al. A comprehensive doctrine
was likewise at issue in a recent Italian court decision that ordered crucifixes removed
from a public school. See Associated Press, Vatican Rebukes Judge for Ban on
Crucifixes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2003, at A14.
42. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations Regarding
Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons, June
3, 2003, at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/
documents/rc con cfaith doc_20030731_homosexual-unionsen.html [hereinafter
Considerations].
43. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2488 (2003) (striking a Texas law banning sodomy as
unconstitutional as applied and, further, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick).
44. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 94.
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Given the inflexible position enunciated in the Vatican's
Considerations document, it may be difficult for the Church to support
a political conception of justice like Rawls's, at least if that conception
endorses same-sex relations as a matter of freestanding political
principle. It may be that, when faced with the pluralism of
comprehensive doctrines in the contemporary world, the Church
prefers to press its claim to possessing the truth without engaging in
the search for an overlapping consensus with the many other
comprehensive doctrines on a political conception of justice.
One of the most striking things about Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Lawrence is his defense of the precedent that the Lawrence
majority overruled, Bowers v. Hardwick.45 In defending Bowers,
Scalia appeared wholly supportive of that decision's holding that the
prevailing morality of the Georgia electorate had been a sufficient
basis to justify making sodomy a criminal offense.46 From a Rawlsian
point of view, one might initially think that Scalia simply invoked an
ingredient of the public political values that are central to political
liberalism.47 But the morality invoked in Bowers and defended by
Scalia in dissent in Lawrence is a bare-bones datum that is presented
without reference to supporting public reasons. Moreover, that
morality is deeply contested throughout the nation, much more so
now than at the time Bowers was decided.
Justice White, who wrote for the Court in Bowers, noted that in
1961 every state had criminal sanctions against homosexual conduct. 48
Yet when Bowers was handed down in 1986, only twenty-four states
had anti-homosexual laws in effect.49 Justice White did not address
the significance of that shift in American morality regarding same-sex
conduct. By 2003, however, when Lawrence was decided, the number
of states banning sodomy had dwindled to thirteen. Thus, between
1961 and 2003, thirty-seven states had, either through judicial
decisions or legislative repeals, abandoned their anti-homosexual
laws. That would seem to constitute significant evidence relevant to
the claim that the morality opposing same-sex relations had been
reduced to a distinct minority view in America. Justice Scalia's
dissent takes no account of this dramatic change.
Yet even without that massive shift in moral sentiment, there still
remains the crucial point that moral opposition to homosexuality is, at
a minimum, entangled with a (partially) comprehensive doctrine.
Such a doctrine entails comprehensive values on the nature, purpose,
45. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2472 (validating a
Georgia anti-sodomy law substantially similar to that struck down in Lawrence).
46. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bowers, 478 U.S. at
196.
47. See, e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 236 n.23.
48. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193.
49. Id. at 193-94.
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and value of sexuality, marriage, procreation, and the family. Because
those values are framed and linked together in support of
heterosexuality, the resulting comprehensive doctrine entails negative
values with respect to same-sex acts, relationships, and homosexual
marriage. Whether true or false, a comprehensive doctrine like that is
arguably excluded from the domain of the political, which requires
public reasons for curtailing liberties.
C. Comprehensive Doctrines and Human Rights
Rawls's distinction between comprehensive doctrines and a
freestanding conception of political justice was in significant respects
implicit in the work that preceded and eventually culminated in the
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The process that led to
the Declaration suggests that the drafters of that document attempted
to avoid reliance on comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, one major
U.N. contributor to the theoretical bases of human rights, Jacques
Maritain, who, as an independent philosopher, wrote extensively on
natural law, nevertheless emphasized the importance of putting
philosophy and theory aside in the U.N.'s joint effort to achieve a
statement on human rights that had universal appeal to the member
states of the U.N.
In late 1948 the United Nations General Assembly, meeting in
Paris, voted to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It
was a monumental achievement that gave birth to the human rights
era. The Declaration had been drafted and re-drafted over a two-year
period by the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Chaired by Eleanor
Roosevelt, the Commission was composed of a distinguished group of
internationally recognized scholars and diplomats from various parts
of the world. At numerous junctures in their debates and
deliberations, questions arose concerning the foundations of human
rights. One persistent question was whether such rights could be said
to be universal in scope. If they were universal, that raised the further
question of whether and how the content of human rights could vary
from culture to culture and from religion to religion throughout the
world. In short, were there some things that were universally wrong
to do to persons, no matter the culture or religion that was dominant
in a particular country? And were there some things that were
universally required of nations and peoples to do or provide for all
persons, no matter a country's culture, religion, or dominant
philosophy?
What follows is a brief review of the nature of the background
assumptions informing the Commission's deliberations and debates
leading up to the final adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.5" My primary concern is
50. For the account of the deliberations of the Human Rights Commission, see
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with how the members of the Human Rights Commission avoided, or
attempted to avoid, cultural and religious bias to achieve the claimed
universality of the Declaration. In Rawls's terminology, were they
trying to avoid reliance on particular comprehensive doctrines?
The U.N. approach to articulating a list of universal human rights
relied on a committee of no more than a dozen or so U.N. delegates.
Often the drafting and re-drafting of what came to be called the
Universal Declaration was done by three or four of those delegates,
with Eleanor Roosevelt serving as chair without participating herself
in the actual drafting and editing, yet performing the indispensable
functions of gatekeeper and critic, offering moral and intellectual
support as well as challenges and inspiration to the Commission's
ongoing work. We might call this the "committee approach" to
defining human rights, an approach that certainly has its advantages
within the U.N. context of respect for global diversity. Given the
make-up of the United Nations, it was virtually inevitable that a
committee composed of members from diverse cultural and religious
traditions would draft the Universal Declaration in order to
guarantee, as much as possible, a sense of balance, fairness and
universal representation when the Declaration was presented to the
General Assembly in Paris.51
The Commission's concern for fairness in identifying and
articulating universal human rights was certainly essential and crucial
to their work being acceptable to the members of the U.N. General
Assembly. The fact that the General Assembly ultimately voted to
endorse the Universal Declaration without a single dissenting vote is
some evidence that the Declaration was perceived as fair to all
without favoring a particular culture, philosophy, or religion. In that
sense, the Declaration was, at least in principle, "freestanding,"
independent of particular comprehensive doctrines. To the extent
that it was independent of moral, philosophical, and religious
foundations, the Commission's achievement invites comparison with
Rawls's conceptions of justice as fairness and political liberalism.
Indeed, it is quite possible that Rawls's work could have provided a
better rationale and a more secure justification for human rights than
what was achieved with the Commission's "committee approach."
Had Theory or The Law of Peoples2 been available decades earlier,
Rawls might very well have been invited to join the U.N.'s Education,
Social, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") advisory committee
Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (2001).
51. Whether the make-up of the Commission was sufficiently representative of
world cultures is a question beyond the scope of this Article.
52. It is in The Law of Peoples, supra note 11, that Rawls applies his notion of




of experts on the theoretical bases of human rights. There is,
however, a certain paradox contained in that suggestion, as explained
below.
As noted earlier, one of the main endeavors of the Commission was
to put philosophy aside on the assumption that no one philosophy
would or could be acceptable to all members of the U.N. General
Assembly (nor, for that matter, to the dozen or so delegates who
made up the body of the Human Rights Commission). To turn to
Rawls, an eminent American philosopher, and to rely on his theory of
justice as fairness, had it been available in 1948, would likely have
been quite contrary to the spirit of the Commission's thinking. But
the paradox is removed if Rawls's attempt to "democratize"
philosophy is successful, that is, if his theory of justice is independent
of any particular comprehensive doctrine, such as we find in particular
religions-Judaism, Catholicism, or Islam, for example-or in various
philosophies, such as those of Aristotle, Kant, or Marx. Each of these
religions and philosophies conflicts with one another in many ways
(although, of course, they may have many shared values). But
because they are comprehensive doctrines in competition with others,
they are, as a consequence, unacceptable from the standpoint of
universality, which is precisely what the Human Rights Commission
endeavored to achieve. Here I will focus on the difficult problems of
universality and its apparent antithesis, cultural and philosophical
relativism, which the Commission members confronted time and
again.
The U.N. Charter had mentioned human rights several times in its
Preamble and in several of the Charter's Articles, but it did not state
what they were, much less give an account of their actual or virtual
universality throughout the world. That would be the task of the U.N.
Human Rights Commission. To complete this task, the Commission
had to confront head-on a formidable challenge, which Glendon
describes as follows:
Was it really possible for a fledgling organization to produce a
document acceptable to delegates from all the countries in a
constantly expanding United Nations? By 1948, when the
Declaration was put to a vote, the United Nations had fifty-eight
member states containing four-fifths of the world's population-
twenty-two from the Americas, sixteen from Europe, five from Asia,
eight from the Near and Middle East, four from Africa, and three
from Oceania. Could any values be said to be common to all of
them? What did it mean to speak of certain rights as universal?53
Thus the U.N.'s immaturity and cultural breadth seemed likely to
stymie any proposed resolution which purported to define human
values.
53. Glendon, supra note 50, at 50 (citation omitted).
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As Glendon notes, the UNESCO organization foresaw these very
questions arising and accordingly sought advice from a number of
distinguished philosophers, including French philosopher Jacques
Maritain, the American philosopher Richard McKeon of the
University of Chicago, and Cambridge University political historian
E.H. Carr, who chaired the panel that was known as the Committee
on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights. "The philosophers' group
began its work in March [of 1947] by sending a questionnaire to
statesmen and scholars around the world-including such notables as
Mohandas Gandhi, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Benedetto Croce,
Aldous Huxley, and Salvador de Madariaga-soliciting their views on
the idea of a universal declaration of human rights. 54  The
Committee's report was later published, along with the questionnaire
and many of the responses."
Maritain contributed to this volume and also wrote its
introduction,56 in which he expressed a fairly hopeful outlook for
human rights universality. Here it should be pointed out that
Maritain himself was a highly respected Thomist philosopher (an
exponent of the thought of the thirteenth century philosopher and
theologian St. Thomas Aquinas) and a noted defender of the theory
of natural law. In his role as an independent philosopher, Maritain
would surely have explained the origin and justification of human
rights from within the natural law tradition.57 However, in his
UNESCO essay, he recognized that that tradition was not acceptable
to all "men who come from the four corners of the globe and who not
only belong to different cultures and civilisations, but are of
antagonistic spiritual associations and schools of thought."58  He
emphasized that the goal of the UNESCO philosophers and thinkers
was to achieve an agreement, not on the basis of a shared philosophy,
which was wholly unrealistic, but on the basis of shared practical
goals. While it was unrealistic to expect agreement on "the same
conception of the world, of man and of knowledge," it was possible,
he thought, to achieve consensus on "the affirmation of a single body
of beliefs for guidance in action."59
Maritain's explanation of how this agreement on a "single body of
beliefs" could be achieved seemed to require the abandonment, or at
least the putting aside and bracketing, of philosophical positions and
analysis. For Maritain, philosophy, at least in this context, needed to
54. Id. at 51.
55. Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations (UNESCO ed., 1949)
[hereinafter Human Rights]. This source was a symposium edited by UNESCO with
an Introduction by Jacques Maritain.
56. Id. at 9. Human Rights contains thirty-two responses to the UNESCO
questionnaire; others were received but not published.
57. See, e.g., Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (1951).




turn away from speculation and first principles in order to focus on
the practical issue of deciding what members of diverse cultures and
belief systems could reasonably affirm in light of "the lessons of
experience and history."6 Again and again, Maritain emphasized that
questions of truth must be put aside in favor of "practical convictions"
and common "principles of actions."61 When human rights are our
concern, the approach must be "pragmatic" rather than theoretical.
Despite their differences, those committed to diverse philosophies and
systems of thought can nevertheless achieve a "convergence in
practice" in the enumeration of human rights.62
Maritain's explanation for this "convergence" postulates that
ethical concepts precede and govern systems of moral philosophy,
such systems being the product of sustained reflection. Indeed,
Maritain asserts:
[Tihere is a kind of plant-like formation and growth of moral
knowledge and moral feeling, in itself independent of philosophic
systems and the rational justifications they propound, [so that] while
all these systems quarrel over the why and wherefore, yet in their
practical conclusions they prescribe rules of behavior which are in
the main and for all practical purposes identical for a given age and
culture .... 63
While Maritain's commitment to put philosophy aside was quite
defensible in the context of defining human rights, it would seem,
however, that this focus on the conditions of universal agreement is
itself a most important philosophical task, perhaps one of the most
exalted tasks of political philosophy. That task is to recognize the
limitations of one's own philosophical perspective; to take into
consideration the contrary perspectives of those who embrace
different philosophical principles and values; to realize that one's
"truth" and the other's "truth" are not likely to be reconciled; and
then, most importantly, to work together with those "others" to
achieve a common ground, a core of agreement-based on that
"plant-like formation and growth of moral knowledge"-on what is
needed, in Rawls's terminology, for achieving an "overlapping
consensus' 64 on justice in national and international contexts.
60. Id. at 14. I emphasize "reasonably" in order to suggest a comparison with
Rawls's own emphasis on the "reasonable" in his discussion of political liberalism. See
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 48-54.
61. Again, the comparison with Rawls is apropos. See Rawls, Political Liberalism,
supra note 7, at 94 (arguing that truth is not the aim of political liberalism in the
context of a plurality of comprehensive doctrines).
62. Maritain, supra note 58, at 11-12.
63. Id. at 12. Maritain's position here is similar in some respects to Rawls's
discussion of the moral sentiments in Theory, supra note 4, § 73, at 420, as well as to
his notion of "reflective equilibrium," id. § 9, at 40.
64. For the concept of an "overlapping consensus," see Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 7, at 133.
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As the foregoing discussion suggests, there are important
similarities and parallels between the work of the U.N. Committee on
the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights and Rawls's theoretical
approach to rights within a politically liberal society. First and
foremost, both the Committee and Rawls endeavored to avoid
reliance on a comprehensive doctrine. Second, and relatedly, neither
the Committee nor Rawls started with some putatively indubitable
foundational truth from which rights might be derived; in this way,
both Rawls and the Committee appear to adopt an anti-
foundationalist standpoint inasmuch as any particular foundation they
might adopt would inevitably be controversial. Third, Rawls and the
Committee eschewed deep and abstruse philosophy, in great part
because both wished to achieve the greatest degree of agreement. For
Rawls, that agreement concerned the political conception of justice;
for the Committee, it was the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Fourth, while both concentrated on theoretical
considerations, their theorizing was geared toward achieving practical
agreement within a context of a pluralism of belief in matters of
philosophy, religion, and morality.
If examined at greater length, the parallel achievements of Rawls
and the Committee would reveal several important differences.65
Nonetheless there are many ways in which their separate paths
displayed common concerns: to avoid reliance on comprehensive
doctrines and robust understandings of natural law or natural rights in
order to define a defensible understanding of rights, whether human
or national. We must eventually determine how this relates to the
amendment power provided by the U.S. Constitution, which I will
touch on in one of the scenarios discussed in Part IV.
II. RAWLS ON UNCONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
In his discussion of the role of the Supreme Court as the exemplar
of public reason,' Rawls argues that there are limits to what can be a
valid amendment to the Constitution. For Rawls, this is so even when
the procedures that the Constitution provides for amendment are fully
and correctly followed. Although his view on this issue may not be
representative of the consensus among American constitutional
lawyers and scholars, there are some who, like Rawls, have taken the
position that there are at least implicit substantive limits on the power
65. To clarify, the above account of the similarities between the work of the
Human Rights Commission and Rawls's work on justice obviously ignores many
details in both the Commission's Universal Declaration and Rawls's mature work on
human rights in The Law of Peoples, supra note 11, details that would reveal
significant differences in their respective results. My focus is on certain common
approaches to rights in their respective works.
66. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 231.
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to amend the Constitution.67 What is meant by "substantive limits"?
For the moment, suffice it to say that it refers to constraints on
changes to the content of the Constitution; constraints arising from
existing core freedoms set forth in that document, especially in the
Bill of Rights or those imposed by long-standing traditions; or
constraints resulting from a principled understanding of the purposes
and aims of the Constitution and the amending power set forth
therein.
But first we should note what the Constitution says in regard to this
issue. Article V of the Constitution lays down the required
procedures for amendment. It provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in
either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect
the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;
and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.68
One notable feature of Article V is the exceptions it sets forth to
the amendment power. Specifical'ly, Article V forbade an amendment
that would stop the African slave trade prior to 1808. Further, but
without time limitations, Article V disallows an amendment depriving
a state, without its consent, of its equal representation in the Senate.
The Framers made just these two exceptions-one temporary and one
permanent exception-to the amendment power conferred upon the
people, the states, and the Congress. One could certainly argue, with
due allowance made for those exceptions, that Article V therefore
permits any amendment to the Constitution that is secured by means
of following the procedures of Article V. 69  By its terms, at least,
67. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect
of the Once and Future Polity, in Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and
Practice of Constitutional Amendment 163 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). For an
extensive and insightful review of the essays collected in Responding to Imperfection,
see Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1297 (1995).
68. U.S. Const. art. V.
69. Some theorists maintain that Article V is the exclusive means for amending
the Constitution. See, e.g., David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment
117 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). Other theorists, such as Bruce Ackerman and
Akhil Reed Amar, go further and argue that amendments outside Article V's
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Article V itself does not preclude any substance from forming part of
an amendment. Although this is very probably the canonical
understanding of Article V for most American lawyers,7" it is not at all
Rawls's position. What, then, explains Rawls's opposition to the near-
absolute freedom of the amendment power, which Article V, having
enumerated and entrenched two exceptions to that power, would
appear to allow?
Consider the kind of hypothetical amendments that raise this issue
for Rawls. He questions "whether an amendment to repeal the First
Amendment, say, and to make a particular religion the state religion
with all the consequences of that, or to repeal the Fourteenth
Amendment with its equal protection of the laws, must be accepted by
the Court as a valid amendment."71 What reasons, Rawls asks, might
the Court have for holding such amendments invalid, even when they
are the product of careful and complete adherence to the stringent
supermajority procedures set forth in Article V? The principal reason
that Rawls gives is the nature and purposes of amendments, which he
characterizes in terms of the actual amendments that have been made
a part of our Constitution. These purposes, he says, include adjusting
and broadening constitutional values and removing weaknesses and
defects of the original document. Rawls's fuller explanation is worth
citing:
Consider the following reasons: an amendment is not merely a
change. One idea of an amendment is to adjust basic constitutional
values to changing political and social circumstances, or to
incorporate into the constitution a broader and more inclusive
understanding of those values. The three amendments related to
the Civil War all do this, as does the Nineteenth Amendment
granting women the vote; and the Equal Rights Amendment
attempted the same. At the Founding there was the blatant
contradiction between the idea of equality in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution and chattel slavery of a
subjugated race; there were also property qualifications for voting
and women were denied the suffrage altogether. Historically those
amendments brought the Constitution more in line with its original
promise. Another idea of amendment is to adapt basic institutions
in order to remove weaknesses that come to light in subsequent
constitutional practice. Thus, with the exception of the Eighteenth,
the other amendments concern either the institutional design of
provisions either have occurred or are possible. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994). This latter kind of
amendment is for the most part beyond the scope of this Article.
70. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Transformations 92 (1998).
71. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238. Rawls here refers to
Ackerman, supra note 69, at 319-22, where Ackerman suggests that the Court must
look upon the amendment under discussion as valid. See Political Liberalism, supra
note 7, at 238 n.25.
2004] 1505
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
government, witness the Twenty-second, which allows the president
to serve only two terms; or certain basic matters of policy, witness
the Sixteenth, which grants Congress the power to levy income
taxes. Such has been the role of amendments.72
This account of the past role of amendments is surely persuasive.
Of course, it may not be applicable to recent amendment proposals or
to the basis of future amendments in circumstances we cannot now
imagine. But putting aside questions pertaining to the future until
later, consider how Rawls's views might apply to recent and
controversial amendment proposals, some of which may go beyond
the limited purposes Rawls lists for valid amendments. It should be
noted that none of these amendments has been adopted and may
never be adopted, but they indicate the kind of amendments that are
frequently proposed in the Congress and therefore present test cases
for the criteria Rawls defends for acceptable amendments.
A. Recent and Current Proposals for Amendments
1. The Flag Amendment
In the wake of Supreme Court decisions that struck down laws
designed to prohibit the burning of the American flag,73 amendments
were soon introduced in Congress to give the States and Congress the
authority to ban the physical desecration of the flag.74 One significant
argument against the constitutionality of the flag-burning amendment
was based on the contention that First Amendment free speech rights
are natural rights retained by the people, and that repeal of the First
Amendment would therefore have been unenforceable and
unconstitutional.75 From Rawls's perspective, however, such an
argument would likely depend upon and derive from a comprehensive
doctrine because of the argument's reliance on natural rights; in that
way the argument would therefore exceed the boundaries of a
political theory of justice and likely be perceived as unacceptable from
the perspective of political liberalism. While that is an argument we
can understand from within the scope of Rawls's mature work, it does
72. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238-39 (citations omitted).
73. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989).
74. For relevant commentary, see, for example, John R. Vile, The Case Against
Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in Responding to
Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 191, 202-13
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Murray Dry, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 1990
Sup. Ct. Rev. 69; Robert J. Goldstein, The Great 1989-1990 Flag Flap: An Historical,
Political, and LegalAnalysis, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 19 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Flag-
Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 39 (1990).
75. See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale
L.J. 1073 (1991) (arguing that the flag-burning amendment was unconstitutional
because it violated natural rights retained by the people).
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not necessarily endorse the constitutionality of a flag amendment, for
such an amendment arguably abridges First Amendment free speech
rights. Rather than looking upon First Amendment free speech rights
as natural rights, which rest upon a comprehensive doctrine, a political
conception of free speech might interpret flag desecration as a form of
protected symbolic expression, which is the position taken by the
Court in Texas v. Johnson.7 6 Rawls would likely oppose a flag-burning
amendment on that ground. But would the Court be justified in
invalidating a flag amendment that removes flag desecration from the
purview of First Amendment free speech rights, when that is the will
of a supermajority of the Congress and the States?
2. The Marriage Amendment
Another example of current controversial amendments concerns
proposals in recent years to amend the Constitution so as to define
marriage as a union of two persons of the opposite sex." After the
Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas,78 more advocacy for a
"marriage amendment" is inevitable in light of fears that the
Lawrence case has paved the way for the so-called next step in "the
homosexual agenda,"79 which is same-sex marriage. Those fears were
arguably validated in the more recent decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's decision on November 18, 2003.80 That
decision held that same-sex couples have a constitutional right under
the Massachusetts constitution to the benefits of civil marriage,81
making it even more likely that opponents of same-sex marriage will
seek a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage.82
Whatever the merits of a marriage amendment may be, from a
Rawlsian perspective it is very likely that such an amendment is
another instance of a comprehensive doctrine invading the
freestanding sphere of the political. This is so to the extent that the
case against homosexual marriage tends to be based on such factors as
76. 491 U.S. at 402 (vacating defendant's conviction under Texas law banning flag-
burning).
77. The Alliance for Marriage is one organization that is currently engaged in
advocacy for a federal marriage amendment. See Alliance for Marriage, at
http://www.allianceformarriage.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
78. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
79. Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Paved Way for Marriage Ruling with
Sodomy Law Decision, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2003, at A24.
81. See Pam Belluck, Marriage by Gays Gains Big Victory in Massachusetts, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al. As of this writing in mid-February of 2004, the
Massachusetts legislature is holding a constitutional convention to discuss whether to
counteract the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling authorizing gay marriage.




tradition, status quo morality, and above all on natural law.83 But
Rawls makes no attempt to decide the issue.'
Although Rawls's notion of a comprehensive doctrine may be
relevant to criticizing a marriage amendment, would such an
amendment also transgress the limited purposes that he had argued
are characteristic of the twenty-seven amendments to the
Constitution? 5 There are good reasons for thinking a marriage
amendment would go beyond those criteria. For example, no
amendment to the Constitution has singled out a particular class of
persons and denied its members important rights that all others enjoy.
On the contrary, the amendments concerned with individual rights
have either proscribed their abridgement or conferred rights upon
groups that had been previously denied those rights, as with blacks in
the Fourteenth and women in the Nineteenth Amendments.
One can certainly argue that given the evidence of the genetic
origins of sexual orientation, as is now widely agreed to be the case,
sexual orientation may be no more of a basis for discrimination than is
race, gender, or other immutable characteristics. But whether same-
sex conduct and relationships are purely a matter of choice or a more
or less fixed orientation would appear irrelevant to the principle that
all persons should have equal liberty of conscience and be treated as
equal moral agents. The full exercise of the tw6 moral powers that,
for Rawls, are definitive of moral personality-the capacity for having
a sense of justice and the capacity for choosing a conception of one's
good 86 -require liberty of conscience. Without liberty of conscience
and "the liberty to fall into error and to make mistakes," one is
deprived of the "social conditions necessary for the development and
exercise" of the capacity for a conception of a person's good."
3. The Human Life Amendment
A third example of highly controversial proposals for a
constitutional amendment is the so-called human life amendment,
which has been advocated by various groups since Roe v. Wade88
legalized abortion. In general, this amendment would define the fetus
as a human being and therefore pave the way for proscribing abortion
in all the States. It is unclear how Rawls would regard such an
83. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John Rawls: Collected
Papers 573, 587 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (stating that appeals "against same-sex
marriages, as within the government's legitimate interest in the family, would reflect
religious or comprehensive moral doctrines").
84. Id. at 587 n.38.
85. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238-39.
86. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 442.
87. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 313; see also Michelman, supra
note 1, at 410-14.
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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amendment. But in light of his original remarks on abortion within
his discussion of public reason,89 he would likely oppose the
amendment, but not necessarily think it unconstitutional, as it may not
constitute a "constitutional breakdown" as clearly as he thinks the
amendment repealing the First Amendment would. Indeed, in light of
his more extended remarks on abortion in his introduction to the
paperback edition of Political Liberalism,9" Rawls appears to leave the
question to be determined by a reasonable balance of political values,
without taking a hard and fast position on to what outcome that
reasonable balance would lead.91 By contrast, Ronald Dworkin would
surely argue that a human life amendment would constitute a major
mistake in understanding individual freedom and the role of the
State.92
4. The Foreign-Born Citizens Amendment
In contrast to the three foregoing instances of proposed
amendments, a fourth example is the quite recent and perhaps
somewhat less controversial proposal to permit foreign-born citizens
to qualify for the Office of the President provided they have been
residents and citizens of the United States for a stated number of
years-for example, twenty or more years.93  Assuming that the
purpose of the amendment is to adjust the Constitution to include a
broader understanding of the qualifications of foreign-born citizens,
then the amendment arguably falls within Rawls's list of valid
purposes. In support of the amendment proposal, one could argue
that today's circumstances are arguably far different from those of the
Framers, when fears of foreigners becoming President in the early
decades of the Nation were more understandable and perhaps well-
grounded.
89. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 243 n.32 (suggesting that a
reasonable balance of political values may support a woman's right to abortion in the
first trimester).
90. Id. at lv-lvi n.31.
91. See also John Rawls, Commonwealth Interview with John Rawls, in Collected
Papers 616, 618 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (expressing no opinion as to whether
"things would have gone better or worse if the Court had not made [the] decision [it
made in Roe v. Wade]").
92. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (1993) (arguing that the abortion controversy is
over competing understandings of the intrinsic value of life on which government
should not take a position).
93. See Editorial, A Constitutional Anachronism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 2003, at A10
(suggesting that the Constitution should be amended pursuant to present proposals




B. Rawls's Rationale for Opposing Amendments Repealing
Constitutional Essentials
Let us return now to the type of amendment Rawls considers
objectionable. According to Rawls, amendments are not meant to
dismantle the structure of the Constitution or repeal constitutional
essentials, such as the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
Rather, their primary function is to adjust, broaden, improve, and
correct what is already contained in the Constitution. In this light,
what should the Court do or say in regard to the hypothetical
amendment that repeals the First Amendment's Establishment Clause
or the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Rawls
explains his position:
The Court could say, then, that an amendment to repeal the First
Amendment and replace it with its opposite fundamentally
contradicts the constitutional tradition of the oldest democratic
regime in the world. It is therefore invalid. Does this mean that the
Bill of Rights and the other amendments are entrenched? Well,
they are entrenched in the sense of being validated by long historical
practice. They may be amended in the ways mentioned above but
not simply repealed and reversed. Should that happen, and it is not
inconceivable that the exercise of political power might take that
turn, that would be constitutional breakdown, or revolution in the
proper sense, and not a valid amendment of the constitution. The
successful practice of its ideas and principles over two centuries
place restrictions on what can now count as an amendment,
whatever was true at the beginning.
94
Again, Rawls's reasoning is surely persuasive. But we should notice
that Rawls is not here invoking the perennial conflict between legal
positivism and natural law, and taking the side of the latter in
repudiating amendments that repeal core constitutional freedoms.
Rather, he cites long-standing tradition and the successful practice of
the Constitution's principles and values over the course of our history
in defense of those core freedoms.95 It is on that basis that Rawls
characterizes the repeal of the Clauses at issue as a "constitutional
breakdown" or "revolution. "96 But if longstanding tradition and
practice immunize core constitutional freedoms from repeal, that
94. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 239 (citations omitted).
95. See Solum, supra note 1, at 576 (stating that for Rawls it is "legal practice and
not natural law that immunizes the freedoms of speech and religion from the
amendment process").
96. See Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just
Democratic Constitution, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 619, 663 (1994) (characterizing repeal
of the First Amendment as "constitutional suicide, the destruction of the most
fundamental features of a democratic society") [hereinafter Freeman, Democratic
Constitution]; see also Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation,
and the Constitution, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 42 (1992) [hereinafter Freeman, Original
Meaning] (describing the same as a "constitutional breakdown").
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introduces a barrier into Article V that is plainly absent from its text
and perhaps even contrary to its spirit. Moreover, deciding when and
where to apply that barrier to amendments poses great difficulties.
Some of our long-standing traditions and practices have been
abandoned precisely through the amendment process, the Civil War
Amendments and the Nineteenth Amendment being notable
examples. Of course, Rawls looks upon those amendments as
examples of "incorporat[ing] into the constitution a broader and more
inclusive understanding of [constitutional] values.""7  Perhaps that
indicates the inherent ambiguity in the appeal to American traditions
and practices.
One can easily expand on Rawls's opposition to "radical"
amendments. For example, in light of the obvious reality of a
"pluralism" of comprehensive doctrines in our society-the very
pluralism that led Rawls to transform Theory into Political
Liberalism-the repeal of the First or Fourteenth Amendment would
necessarily do great damage to the continued existence of that
pluralism. From Rawls's perspective, repealing the Establishment
Clause and endangering liberty of conscience introduces an
unreasonable comprehensive doctrine into the very core of our
constitutional framework,98 completely reversing central aspects of
our constitutional traditions.
C. Views in Support of Rawls's Position
Given the foregoing considerations, it is not surprising that others
concur with Rawls's view that some constitutional amendments that
are proposed and ratified in accordance with the procedural
requirements of Article V may nonetheless be invalid and require the
Supreme Court to reject them. What follows is a summary of a few of
the arguments that are parallel to Rawls's own thinking on invalid
constitutional amendments.
1. Walter F. Murphy
Over the course of many years Walter F. Murphy has argued
forcefully in several articles for a position that is similar to Rawls's.99
Murphy certainly recognizes the need for and validity of constitutional
change; he could hardly do otherwise. Indeed, at the outset of
Merlin's Memory Murphy quotes the words of Noah Webster: "The
very attempt to make perpetual constitutions, is the assumption of a
right to controul the opinions of future generations; and to legislate
97. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238.
98. Id. at 59 (distinguishing unreasonable comprehensive doctrines from
reasonable ones).
99. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 67, at 163 n.3 (citing other articles where he has
written on substantive limits to the amending power).
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for those over whom we have as little authority as we have over a
nation in Asia." 100 Murphy also cites Edmund Burke, "the prophet of
conservatism," to the same effect: "[A] state without the means of
some change is without the means of its own conservation."'01
Yet change tout court is not the issue; it is rather the kind of change
proposed for the Constitution. As Murphy says, "some change is not
the same as any change."1 2 According to Murphy, change must be
evaluated in terms of norms governing "the political desirability, the
procedural propriety, or the substantive legitimacy of any specific
proposal for change."'0 3 Suppose, for example, that the people decide
to abolish constitutional democracy in return for a charismatic
leader's promise of prosperity in a time of a severe economic
downturn. Although the people can agree to such a transformation,
Murphy asks: "May a people who accepted constitutional democracy
democratically or constitutionally authorize such a political
transmutation? May the new system validly claim to draw its
authority from the consent of the governed?"''" Murphy thinks not,
and for a variety of reasons, all of which, according to him, point to
the necessity for substantive limitations on the amending power.
Textual Limits. There are arguably explicit textual prohibitions on
certain kinds of changes.105 For example, Murphy notes that the First
Amendment can be seen as prohibiting its own repeal by an Act of
Congress, because the text of the First Amendment clearly states that
Congress shall make no law abridging freedoms enumerated
therein.' 6 That argument, however, may be overcome by other
considerations, noted by Murphy.0 7
Semantic Meaning. There is the semantic argument that the word
amend means correcting or improving, not deconstructing,
reconstructing, or replacing and abandoning the fundamental
principles of the Constitution. 8 "[V]alid amendments can operate
only within the existing political system; they cannot... replace the
polity." 109
Normative Constraints. The normative theory embedded in the
Constitution imposes prohibitions on the amending power. "Any
100. Id. at 163 (citing Noah Webster, Bills of Rights, in Collection of Essays and
Fugitive Writings on Moral, Historical, Political and Literary Subjects 47 (1790)).
101. Id. at 168 (citing Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 19-
20 (Dutton 1910) (1790)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 175.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 175-76 n.40.
107. Id.; see also Michelman, supra note 67, at 1304 n.29 (arguing that this textual
interpretation of the First Amendment is not a "compelling argument").
108. Murphy, supra note 67, at 176-77.
109. Id. at 177.
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change that would transform the polity into a political system that was
totalitarian, or even so authoritarian as not to allow a wide space for
human freedom, would be illegitimate, no matter how pure the
procedures and widespread the public support."'10
Natural Law and Natural Rights. Because the Preamble to the
Constitution includes the important aim of establishing justice, and
because "American tradition implants the nation's founding
document, the Declaration of Independence, into the larger
Constitution, natural rights impose binding standards on public
officials." '' Thus, "[w]hatever one's opinion of the intellectual worth
of natural law and natural rights, the text of the supreme law of the
land recognizes and protects them."" 2
Each of Murphy's points are certainly relevant to establishing
credible grounds for limiting the amending power. Each one is also
controversial, of course, and may not be decisive or convincing, all
things considered.' For example, following Sotirios A. Barber,
Murphy recognizes that "a full commitment to reason allows only a
provisional commitment to constitutional democracy because we must
be open to rational persuasion about the moral necessity, or at least
desirability, of systemic transformation of the polity."'1 4 For Murphy,
a constitutional democracy would permit a radical transformation, but
only to a "system that would enlarge reason's empire or strengthen its
reign.""' 5 I will draw upon these last points in the Conclusion to this
Article.
2. Stephen Macedo and Samuel Freeman
Like Murphy, Stephen Macedo and Samuel Freeman also argue
against the view that Article V procedures will ipso facto guarantee
the validity of constitutional amendments. Macedo's position " 6 is
similar to Rawls's; in fact Rawls cites Macedo's work with approval.117
In effect, Macedo argues that parts of the Constitution are more
110. Id. at 179. For an argument that questions the cogency of Murphy's position
on this point, see Michelman, supra note 67, at 1306 & n.35.
111. Murphy, supra note 67, at 180-81.
112. Id.
113. For critical analysis of Murphy's position, see John R. Vile, The Case Against
Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in Responding to
Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 191, 196-201
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). "To empower the courts not simply to review the
procedures whereby amendments were adopted but also to void amendments on the
basis of their substantive content would surely threaten the notion of a government
founded on the consent of the governed." Id. at 198.
114. Murphy, supra note 67, at 189 (referring to Sotirios A. Barber, The
Constitution of Judicial Power 60-61, 186-87, 232-34 & n.265 (1984)).
115. Id.
116. See Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in
Liberal Constitutionalism 182-83 (1990).
117. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238 & n.26.
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fundamental than other provisions, and an amendment that repealed
fundamental constitutional freedoms would be "unintelligible and
revolting from the perspective of the Constitution as a whole."11
Thus, according to Macedo, "the first freedoms of speech and the
press, the requirement of warrants for police searches, the right to
confront witnesses, and to a trial by jury, even the elaborate
procedures required to amend the Constitution, all these provisions
and more represent basic structural commitments to institutionalizing
a process of free and reasonable self-government. '"1 9 Consequently,
"[a]n amendment which sought to expunge that basic commitment
and to wipe out basic political and personal freedoms intrinsic to
reasonable self-government suggests a desire to revolutionize rather
than correct and amend... and so it would properly be held by the
Supreme Court to be a nullity."'2 °
Two of Macedo's contentions are troublesome. First, he may be
implying that the Constitution protects freedoms "intrinsic to
reasonable self-government" under all social and economic
circumstances, both now and in the future. But that strong claim
would be virtually impossible to support with convincing arguments.
For one thing, future contingencies may require us to revise whatever
view we now hold about which freedoms are intrinsic to the
Constitution and to reasonable self-government. Second, he assumes
without argument that it is part of the role of the Supreme Court to
exercise judicial review of the substantive content of amendments. Of
course, on this second point Rawls's position is no different. But as
discussed below, there are persuasive reasons that arguably explain
the Court's refusal to exercise oversight of the substantive content of
validly ratified constitutional amendments. '
Unlike Macedo, who wrote of the problem under discussion before
Political Liberalism was published, Samuel Freeman directly
addresses Rawls's opposition to amendments repealing core
constitutional freedoms. l2  Freeman concedes that Rawls here
embraces a "radical idea," '23 the idea, namely, "that not everything
enacted according to Article V procedures constitutes a valid
amendment to the constitution." ' 4 For example, First Amendment
freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly identify the most basic of
the democratic liberties-liberty of conscience and freedom of
thought:
118. Macedo, supra note 116, at 183.
119. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
120. Id.
121. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
122. Freeman, Democratic Constitution, supra note 96.
123. Id. at 662.
124. Id.
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Without freedom of thought, inquiry, and discussion, public
reasoning about the constitution and democracy itself would not be
possible. For the sovereign people to attempt to give up these
liberties for the sake of other values is not a legitimate amendment
to the constitution. It is constitutional suicide, the destruction of the
most fundamental features of a democratic society. These basic
liberties are then "inalienable," to use the eighteenth century term;
they cannot be bartered away. As such they are constitutionally
entrenched. 125
Freeman's remarks are germane to the discussion of the basis of
equality in Part III below, which returns to the subject of democracy
and its importance to Rawls's position on the amendment issue.
3. William F. Harris II
William Harris offers an extended reflection on constitutional
change in his book The Interpretable Constitution.12 6  Chapter 4,
"Revising the Constitutional Polity: The Limits of Textual
Amendability," is devoted entirely to the subject. It is complex,
original, and in many respects a profound reflection on the subject. In
many ways, however, the earlier chapters in his book bear importantly
on the amendability issue. Here it is possible only to summarize a few
of his ideas on constitutional change.
From one perspective, the position Harris develops can be used in
support of Rawls's claims on acceptable amendments; but there is
another side to Harris's thought that allows for radical change. On
the one hand, Harris argues that "[t]he solidity of the constitutional
world rests on the possibility of other constitutional worlds, or revised
versions of the present one, being brought into being in its place. 127
On the other, he argues that the form, design, or wholeness of the
constitutional document must be respected and left intact. For the
Federalists, at least, the meaning of the Constitution's text "was to be
found in the character of its project, not in its sentences. "128
Accordingly, Article V should not be viewed as a freestanding
provision, for "one provision of the document should not be
interpreted so as to destroy the whole text." '129 As far as the use of
Article V is concerned, any change or amendment, according to
Harris, "must continue to make sense within the preexisting scheme of
constitutional meaning."13' Harris's position is obviously congruent
with Rawls's.
Harris presents a double-stranded view of constitutional change by
125. Id. at 663 (emphases added).
126. Harris, supra, note 9.
127. Id. at 166.
128. Id. at 172.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 183.
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making a distinction between amendments that employ the
procedures of Article V, and a more or less complete revolution of the
constitutional polity by the action of the sovereign people. Whatever
changes that come about through the use of Article V must be in
conformity with the "wholeness" of the Constitution; on the other
hand, the whole people, in virtue of their ultimate sovereignty, may
suspend "the system by which it was previously represented. The
theological equivalent would be to say that the immediate actuality of
divine power.., would return the universe to the original void for a
new beginning." '31 Harris puts the distinction crisply:
The verification of the sovereign constitution maker is precisely in
its capacity to remake what it has made, when it acts as sovereign, on
a view of its whole enterprise-and only then. But in the practical
Article V amending process, when the machinery of government is
acting as the agent of the people in its sovereign capacity, the notion
of limits not only makes sense; it is necessary.
32
Much remains to be said about Harris's positions on constitutional
change, but in light of the foregoing, it can be said that his
understanding of Article V is supportive of Rawls's view on the limits
of Article V.
D. Views Opposing Rawls's Position
1. Jed Rubenfeld and Christopher L. Eisgruber
Theorists who appear to oppose Rawls's position on the limits to
constitutional amendment do so on more categorical grounds,
emphasizing what amounts to a virtual absolute freedom conferred by
Article V. Among these theorists are Jed Rubenfeld'33 and
Christopher L. Eisgruber.M Although Rubenfeld defends a theory of
commitment to constitutional values over time, he nevertheless argues
that,
[t]he very principle that gives the Constitution legitimate
authority-the principle of self-government over time-requires
that a nation be able to reject any part of a constitution whose
commitments are no longer the people's own. Thus written
constitutionalism requires a process not only of popular
constitution-writing, but also of popular constitution-rewriting. 3
5
Rubenfeld goes so far as to state, in clear opposition to a position
such as Rawls's, that "constitutionalism always permits the possibility
131. Id. at 184 n.14.
132. Id. at 193.
133. Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-
Government (2001).
134. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
135. Rubenfeld, supra note 133, at 174.
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of legitimate rupture, of a revolutionary process of popular rewriting
that takes place, in part or in whole, outside every existing political
institution. 13 6 Thus, from Rubenfeld's perspective, it would appear
that the long-standing traditions, principles and practices emphasized
in Rawls's position do not constitute a bar to radical changes via
Article V.
Similarly, Eisgruber, referring to Article V, argues that "[a]
constitutional procedure that enables people to entrench good rules
and institutions will also enable them to entrench bad rules and
institutions. A people must have the freedom to make controversial
political choices, and that freedom will necessarily entail the freedom
to choose badly. 13 7 But whether the people's freedom to choose
badly includes the freedom to decide to abolish their future freedom
to choose is questionable. Harris, for example, argues that "[t]he only
constraint on the constitution maker, as on any sovereign, is that this
people must always act so as to preserve and fulfill its sovereignty-
framing its mandates generally and abstractly, and maintaining its
capacity to rethink the constitutional order as a whole." '138 This
conflict between Eisgruber and Harris is important, but it may be
resolved in Part V below, where an attempt is made to reconcile two
contrasting strands of Rawls's thought, which are parallel to the claims
made above by Eisgruber and Harris.
2. Walter Dellinger and Judicial Review
One response to the claims of Rawls, Murphy, Freeman, and
Macedo-that repealing a core constitutional freedom, such as the
First Amendment Establishment Clause, would be tantamount to
revolution or a constitutional breakdown-is found in Walter
Dellinger's discussion of the amendment issues that surfaced in
controversies over the Equal Rights Amendment.139  Although
Dellinger was there concerned mainly with process questions, such as
the appropriateness of judicial review of contested issues about valid
ratifications and rescission of ratifications, he made an important
point about substance. For the framers of the Constitution, meeting
in Philadelphia in 1787,
[t]he formal amendment process set forth in article V represents a
domestication of the right to revolution. Article V maintains the
spirit of 1776-the right of the people to alter or abolish an
inadequate government. But the manner of the right's exercise is
circumscribed. Change is permitted, but only through the modes
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Eisgruber, supra note 134, at 120.
138. Harris, supra note 9, at 203.
139. Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1983).
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specifically sanctioned in the charter of government itself. Article V
is thus a very conservative rendering of the right of revolution. 4 '
Needless to say, if Dellinger is correct that Article V provides for an
orderly and constitutional means of effectuating a revolution, then the
serious reservations of Rawls, Freeman, and others about
"constitutional breakdown" and "revolution" may be somewhat
beside the point, because the Framers themselves, according to
Dellinger, were arguably anticipating, and providing a peaceful means
of responding to, the very conditions where actual breakdown and
revolution might otherwise occur.
Elsewhere Dellinger also provides a reason for rejecting the
Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review of the substance of
constitutional amendments: "Judicial review of the merits of
proposed amendments is illegitimate for the simple reason that the
Constitution places virtually no limits on the content of amendments.
With two express exceptions, Congress is constitutionally free to
propose, and the states to ratify, any amendment whatsoever."14' Like
Rawls, Dellinger acknowledges that "the Constitution taken as a
whole stands for certain enduring principles, and [that] one can
construct meaningful arguments that a particular proposed
amendment is inconsistent with those principles.' 1 42 That seems to be
at least part of the basis for Rawls's opposition to certain radical
amendment proposals, the fact that they are inconsistent with
important principles and values contained in the historical
Constitution. 14  Nonetheless, Dellinger claims that "arguments about
the political wisdom of proposed amendments are only arguments;
they can never be translated into judicial rules of positive law that
confine the ultimate discretion of the proposing Congress and the
ratifying legislatures."'"
What Dellinger may have in mind in speaking of the inability to
translate arguments against proposed amendments into positive rules
140. Id. at 431 (citation omitted). But see Michael Parenti, The Constitution as an
Elitist Document, in How Democratic is the Constitution 39, 47 n.18 (Robert A.
Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980) (arguing that the Constitution was
designed to preserve an undemocratic class structure, making sweeping changes
almost impossible). See also Dellinger, supra note 139, at 431 n.235 (commenting on
Parenti's position).
141. Walter Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 446,
447-48 (1983) (citations omitted) (responding to Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution
We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433
(1983)); see id. at 448 n.14 (citing William Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the
United States, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 659, 661 (1920) ("With this enumeration of the matters
which the convention thought necessary to withdraw from the amending power, it
would seem to be impossible to infer an intention that any other restrictions were
intended to be placed upon the character of amendments that might be adopted.")).
142. Id. at 448.
143. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238-39.
144. Dellinger, supra note 141, at 448.
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of law is, among other things, our obvious inability to foresee,
understand, and evaluate the totality of circumstances that would
recommend the proposal and ratification of amendments at some
future time. To be sure, the framers of Article V foreclosed two
possible amendments within the body of Article V. But those
entrenched provisions were arguably required simply to assure the
ratification of the Constitution itself, not to foreclose other kinds of
change in the future.
E. A Question of Time?
In evaluating Rawls's position, perhaps some will say, in his
defense, that we must remember that he was considering a radical
idea that originated with Ackerman's hypothesis of a "Christianity
Amendment," an extreme example of a constitutional amendment
that is so diametrically opposed to our present constitutional tradition
as to be almost unthinkable today.145 Yet Rawls himself took it
seriously; as he said, "it is not inconceivable that the exercise of
political power might take that turn.'
'1 46
Indeed, Rawls's worry may seem all the more tenable when we
consider the growth and political influence of religious
fundamentalism in contemporary America and elsewhere in the
world. The recent and unsuccessful attempt to maintain a display of
the Ten Commandments in the lobby of the Alabama Supreme Court
in violation of a federal court order to remove the display suggests
that the separation of church and state is not in grave danger. 47 It is
not difficult, however, to imagine the gradual growth over the course
of years or decades of a build-up of popular support for a much more
extensive integration of law and religion. When we consider the
feasibility of a Christianity (or Islamic) Amendment synchronically,
across time, the danger may not be perceived as readily as it might be
if we looked at these things diachronically, over a longer course of
time. The difficulty with that longer stretch of time, of course, is that
the longer it is the more we lose perspective and understanding. Two
periods of consciousness-the present in relation to the past, or the
present in relation to the future-are very difficult to span. But when
we are dealing with the past we know something about that past from
abundant sources of information. The future, on the other hand,
never quite is; what we know about the future is at best a matter of
conjecture.
Perhaps that conclusion counsels greater respect for the decisions of
future generations of citizens, reminding us that present convictions
and circumstances within the status quo are not and cannot be the
145. See Ackerman, supra note 70, at 14.
146. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 239.
147. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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only measures of the constitutionality of an amendment. Thus (so the
argument would run) the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, or any number of other core rights or freedoms now
protected, are vulnerable wherever convictions and circumstances
have changed dramatically, particularly within the distant and
contingent future. Given where we stand today in our constitutional
democracy, it is nearly impossible for us to imagine the moral,
philosophical, and religious doctrines that may prevail 100 or 200
years from now. Perhaps even more importantly for present
purposes, the problem with imagining or predicting the central values
and the social and economic circumstances of the future, along with
their implications for our fundamental law, is even more acute, as
those values and circumstances will depend on a far greater number of
variables. Consider, for example, the impact of a dramatic and severe
decline of social and economic conditions. Such a decline could be so
devastating as to require drastic and unprecedented limitations or
repeal of many of the equal liberties. We cannot know the
combination of conditions that would lead to a repeal of the
Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses, but because we cannot,
that may constitute a sufficient condition for not foreclosing that
remote possibility in advance. After exploring Rawls's position on the
basis of equality in Part III and how the Court might decide in Part
IV, I return to the above points in Part V.
III. RAWLS ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY
There is another approach to the issue discussed in the foregoing
part that may yield a sounder and more attractive defense of Rawls's
position on the amendment issue. We have been assuming that the
amendment under review would repeal such core freedoms as the
Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. In either event
the fundamental equality of citizens in our constitutional democracy
would be dramatically affected. In Rawls's terminology, those
amendments would violate the "basis of equality." What is meant by
the basis of equality? Rawls has two different explanations of this
concept, one in Theory148 and another in Political Liberalism.49
Distinguishing them will further illuminate the main difference
between Rawls's two major works.
A. The Basis of Equality in A Theory of Justice
Rawls gives an account of the basis of equality in Theory that
explains "the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to
be treated in accordance with the principles of justice.""15  The
148. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 77, at 441.
149. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 19, 79-81, 109-10.
150. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 77, at 441.
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underlying question concerns "what sorts of beings are owed the
guarantees of justice.' ' 1 Rawls explains:
The natural answer seems to be that it is precisely the moral persons
who are entitled to equal justice. Moral persons are distinguished by
two features: first they are capable of having (and are assumed to
have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of
life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to
acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and
to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum
degree.' 2
Thus, in Theory, moral personality is a potentiality that is ordinarily
realized by human beings, and this potentiality for moral personality
Rawls regards as the foundation of and "a sufficient condition for
being entitled to equal justice." '153 If human beings did not possess
these two moral powers or capacities, presumably they would not be
entitled to equal justice. But because human beings do (normally)
possess these capacities, then "[t]his fact can be used to interpret the
concept of natural rights."'54 Rawls explains his reference to natural
rights:
For one thing, it explains why it is appropriate to call by this name
the rights that justice protects. These claims depend solely on certain
natural attributes the presence of which can be ascertained by
natural reason pursuing common sense methods of inquiry. The
existence of these attributes and the claims based upon them is
established independently from social conventions and legal
norms.
155
It is the presence of these attributes in human beings that entitles
them to make claims based on these attributes. For Rawls, it is thus
natural for us to seek justice, to make claims based upon our nature,
our natural attributes. Arguably, it is even our responsibility to make
claims that we believe are justly derived from our natural attributes.
It is also natural for us to challenge conventions and taboos that are
inconsistent with or contrary to the claims we sincerely believe are
naturally or reasonably derived from these natural attributes. Rawls's
founding of equality and justice upon natural attributes of persons,
and his association of the concept of natural rights with this
foundation, implies that a great many rights derive from the two
moral capacities he attributes to persons. Indeed, it opens the door to
a palace of rights that Theory never attempted to identify or define.
There is a ready explanation for that: Rawls's immediate concerns
151. Id. at 442.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 442 n.30.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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were simply more fundamental and foundational to the underlying
theory of justice itself.
Thus, a person's capacities for a sense of justice and a conception of
the good do not conclude the rendering of justice, but identify its
natural starting point. To be meaningful, a person's natural capacities
necessarily include an indefinite number of claims that derive from
and depend upon those defining human capacities. Otherwise, the
presence of the two powers Rawls identifies is illusory and opaque:
They would fail to have real consequences and would not qualify the
force of the claims persons may make about the justice and the
goodness of the fundamental decisions that define their lifeways. If
we are to take rights seriously, we must therefore attend to the
comprehensive dimensions and the more extensive implications of our
moral powers to give justice and define, pursue, and revise our
conceptions of the good.
We might pause to note Ronald Dworkin's comments on Rawls's
use of the term "natural rights." Dworkin was the first to identify
Rawls's method as constructivist.'56 He also noted the natural rights
foundations of Rawls's theory, even though it was a term Dworkin
avoided in describing that theory "because it has, for many people,
disqualifying metaphysical associations." '157 Such people "think that
natural rights are supposed to be spectral attributes worn by primitive
men like amulets, which they carry into civilization to ward off
tyranny."'58 But within the constructive model:
[T]he assumption of natural rights is not a metaphysically ambitious
one. It requires no more than the hypothesis that the best political
program, within the sense of that model, is one that takes the
protection of certain individual choices as fundamental, and not
properly subordinated to any goal or duty or combination of
these.1
59
For Dworkin, Rawls's assumption of natural rights therefore does not
involve a dubious ontology-at least no more dubious than the
fundamental concepts that direct utilitarian theories of justice.
Thus, from Dworkin's perspective, Rawls's 'deep theory' renders
rights natural rather than the long-term outcome of custom or explicit
legislation. Natural or fundamental rights are the independent
grounds for assessing the justice of custom and legislation. We can,
156. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 91 & n.1 (citing Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 159-68 (1978)).
157. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 176 (1978). For similar reasons,
Dworkin has avoided use of the natural law label. But see Ronald Dworkin, "Natural"
Law Revisited, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 165 (1982) (reluctantly adopting the label of
"naturalism" in describing his theory of adjudication).
158. Dworkin, supra note 157, at 176.
159. Id. at 176-77.
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Dworkin says, test this theory of natural rights by examining "its
power to unite and explain our political convictions.""16
To avoid the conclusion that Theory was a strong and explicit
defense of natural rights, it is helpful to note that the only place Rawls
refers to natural rights as applying to his theory is in a single footnote
within his discussion of the "basis of equality," which occurred well
over 400 pages into Theory.'6 1 Yet he does refer to the concept of
natural rights in that one footnote. But any claim that arises from our
moral personality's natural attributes (the two moral powers), "the
presence of which can be ascertained by natural reason pursuing
common sense methods of inquiry," 162 is not, to repeat Dworkin's
phrase, a "metaphysically ambitious one."
If, as Rawls holds, "the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient
condition for being entitled to equal justice," '63 and if core
constitutional freedoms such as free speech, equality, free exercise of
religion, and the like, are based on claims that implicate the two
natural capacities known by those "common sense methods of
inquiry,"" then we have a further and perhaps deeper explanation for
Rawls's opposition to amendments that would repeal the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. Such amendments
would violate the basis of equality by infringing on the exercise of the
two moral powers, the two natural capacities that in significant
respects define us as persons. From this perspective, those
amendments would not only constitute a "constitutional breakdown"
or "revolution," but a dismantling of human persons as they are
known by means of Rawls's "common sense methods of inquiry."
Does Rawls's account of equality have parallels in the law?
Arguably one finds evidence of his natural rights account of equality
in many of the decisions of the Supreme Court, some of which
antedate the appearance of Theory. One outstanding example is
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,1 65
which established the constitutional right of privacy in the course of
holding that married persons have a right to use birth control devices
and receive medical counseling concerning their use. In writing about
the marital right of privacy, Justice Douglas ended his opinion with
these words: "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system."'" His opinion bristles with overtones of a natural right to
160. Id. at 177.
161. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 442 n.30.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 442.
164. Id. at 442 n.30.
165. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
166. Id. at 486.
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make fundamental decisions analogous to the one at issue in
Griswold.167
Writing for the Court several years after Griswold in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,168 Justice Brennan characterized the right of privacy more
broadly: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. ' 169 That
language, of course, foreshadowed the decision of the Court the
following term in Roe v. Wade,17° where the Court endorsed the
proposition that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." ''
Those three decisions are examples of situations where persons-
married couples, single persons, and pregnant women-exercise their
moral powers by giving voice to their natural capacity for a sense of
justice and a conception of their good. We cannot claim that Rawls's
early work influenced the Court's holdings in those cases. The point is
rather that we can look to Rawlsian ideas to better understand those
and many other decisions of the Court. We might, for example,
rewrite the Griswold rationale for marital privacy in sexual matters to
reflect the idea that the underlying claim for privacy justly and
reasonably arises from persons' natural moral powers to seek justice
and express their firm sense of their good, which no state should be
allowed to deny except for extraordinary and grave reasons.
Likewise, we can appreciate the great importance of the right to
choose abortion to a pregnant woman for the same reasons. The state
may well encourage a woman so situated to exercise responsibility in
making her decision, but not go as far as to coerce the decision."'
The foregoing account of the basis of equality in Theory may appeal
to philosophers just as it did to Rawls in his early work. But because
it is more a matter of philosophical argument than constitutional
analysis, it is doubtful that the majority of constitutional lawyers
would accept this account as a basis for limiting the substantive
content of constitutional amendments. Moreover, Rawls's account of
the basis of equality in Theory seems to be part of a comprehensive
167. As one scholar noted, shortly after Griswold was handed down, "[t]he Jesuit
magazine America noted the irony of some of the justices essentially having to rely on
'higher law' or 'natural law' derivations in order to strike down a law that the church
for so many decades had defended on quite different but similarly labeled 'natural
law' grounds." David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the
Making of Roe v. Wade 256-57 (1994).
168. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right of privacy concerning the use of
contraceptives to single persons).
169. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
170. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
171. Id. at 153.
172. See generally Dworkin, supra note 92; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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doctrine inasmuch as it grounds itself on a theory of natural rights,
even in the limited way in which Rawls embraces that theory. To the
degree that Rawls departs from that comprehensive doctrine and
substitutes another explanation for the basis of equality in Political
Liberalism, we should consider putting aside the earlier account and
examine his new rationale. For one thing, it may be more acceptable
to constitutional lawyers and even influence the Court's decision if
ever it is faced with an amendment repealing the core constitutional
values that Rawls was concerned would be unjustly eroded.
B. The Basis of Equality in Political Liberalism
The major difference in Rawls's discussion of the basis of equality
in Political Liberalism is the apparent absence of any reference to
natural rights. Rather than claiming, as he did in Theory, that persons
have the two moral powers as natural capacities or attributes, and
relating these attributes of moral personality to a natural rights
foundation,173 in Political Liberalism Rawls presents a more
straightforwardly political account of the two moral powers and their
relation to the basis of equality. This change, of course, reflects his
goal of detaching his conception of justice from any and all
dependence on a comprehensive doctrine.
Before stating what Rawls says about the basis of equality in
Political Liberalism, let us first consider a few aspects of the
background and foundation for his position. For Rawls, "the
fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness ... is that of society
as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the
next." '174 Rawls takes this idea "to be implicit in the public culture of a
democratic society." '75 Because those who engage in these "fair terms
of cooperation" in the "public culture of a democratic society" are
persons, we obviously need some conception of what we mean by
persons. Rawls explains:
Beginning with the ancient world, the concept of the person has
been understood, in both philosophy and law, as the concept of
someone who can take part in, or who can play a role in, social life,
and hence exercise and respect its various rights and duties. Thus,
we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a
normal and fully cooperating member of society. 17 6
Unless we accept what Rawls says here, we can make no sense of
our social, legal, and political institutions, which are precisely founded
upon such implicit ideas and which impute all sorts of capacities,
responsibilities and liabilities to persons. And because Rawls's
173. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 77, at 442 n.30.
174. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 15.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 18.
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starting point is the tradition of democratic thought, he also thinks of
citizens as free and equal. He explains:
The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity
for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the
powers of reason (of judgment, thought, and inference connected
with these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to
the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of
society makes persons equal.' 77
Rawls then elaborates on this, and makes the critical point I want to
emphasize:
[S]ince persons can be full participants in a fair system of social
cooperation, we ascribe to them the two moral powers connected
with the elements in the idea of social cooperation [already]
noted ... : namely, a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity
for a conception of the good .... 178
Thus, instead of grounding the basis of equality on natural rights, as
he did in Theory, Rawls now ascribes the two moral powers to persons
in virtue of their successful democratic practices as free and equal
persons over the course of generations. The logic of this reasoning is
compelling: Unless we ascribe (impute or attribute) the two moral
powers to persons, and unless persons with these powers are free and
equal, we cannot explain or understand their long-standing and
successful practices within a public democratic culture, to which our
Constitution is committed in manifold ways. There is no deep
ontology or metaphysics involved here; nor is there any attribution of
natural rights to persons, as there was in the one footnote in Theory. 7 9
What we have is rather an example of Rawls's common sense
methodology, now applied to the task of restricting his conception of
justice to the political in order to achieve a "freestanding" conception
of justice and thereby appeal to all reasonable comprehensive
doctrines for their endorsement of an overlapping consensus on the
political conception of justice.
What might this now say to constitutional lawyers, particularly with
reference to hypothetical amendments that would repeal core
constitutional freedoms, or establish a religion, or do away with the
equal protection of the laws? It would tell them that what is at stake
in adopting such amendments is the implicit understanding of persons
as free and equal and to whom we necessarily "ascribe" the moral
capacities to have conceptions of justice and the good, all of which
underwrites the very possibility of our having a public democratic
culture.
Rawls is right, at least to this extent: The amendments he opposes,
177. Id. at 19 (citing Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 77).
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 77, at 442 n.30.
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if adopted by Congress, the States, and the people, would be
tantamount to a constitutional breakdown or revolution if only
because they would be such radical departures from core
constitutional values and principles that rest upon our understanding
of democracy, persons, the basis of equality, and moral personality.
We can therefore see that for Rawls much more is actually at stake
than simply opposing amendments because of their departure from
long-standing traditions and practices. But is Rawls also right in
denying that the Court must accept the amendments as valid? 8° Here
there is room for some disagreement. For one thing, much would
obviously depend on the jurisprudential views of the then sitting
Justices who would have to decide the issue.
IV. How MIGHT THE COURT DECIDE?
Faced with a challenge to an allegedly unconstitutional amendment,
the Court would have a daunting task. It is unlikely that the Justices
would agree on a single rationale for their decision. On the contrary,
we can imagine several scenarios competing for the Justices' votes.
Scenario One. The Court might simply say that they have no
appellate jurisdiction over the substantive content of an amendment,
the reason being that Article V and the Constitution as a whole make
no allowance for judicial oversight of such a matter. On the other
hand, they would no doubt agree to adjudicate questions concerning
the procedural correctness of the manner in which an amendment was
proposed or ratified in light of provisions set forth in Article V. But
procedural problems are not in issue in respect to the amendments
under consideration here. It is precisely the substance of those
amendments that causes concern for Rawls and others. In short, if the
Court were dominated by textualists or narrow originalists, it might
well hold, possibly with great regret, that the plain meaning of Article
V allows for any amendment, regardless of content, apart, of course,
from the one entrenched exception that survives to this day.''
Scenario Two. The Court may summarily decide that judicial
review of the substance of amendments is simply foreclosed on the
theory that these matters are nonjusticiable political questions lying
beyond their jurisdiction. 812
Scenario Three. Unlikely and remote as this scenario may be, the
180. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 238 n.25 (contesting the view
of Bruce Ackerman that the commitment to dualist democracy implies that the Court
must accept such amendments (citation omitted)).
181. See Dow, supra note 69, at 117.
182. See James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 Const. Comm.
355, 375 n.83 (1994) (noting that the common interpretation of Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939), precludes review of amendments). But see Bruce Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 453, 492-99 (1989) (rejecting
the common interpretation of Coleman).
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Court may take the view that constitutional amendments are in any
case irrelevant, for the good reason that if an amendment has been
able to achieve the supermajority support required by Article V, then
the value inscribed in that amendment was arguably already a value of
the American People before its ratification.183 The idea is that
amendments are second-order phenomena that merely instantiate an
already given and realized social and political value of the People.
The underlying argument here would obviously need to be worked
out in much greater detail.
Scenario Four. Drawing upon an insight of Professor Fleming, we
might say that "the question whether the Supreme Court has
authority to declare amendments (or original provisions)
unconstitutional presents a case of what Hart would call uncertainty in
the penumbra of the ultimate rules of recognition." 184 Yet this
uncertainty will not necessarily prevent a court from rendering a
decision. Expanding on his meaning, Hart explains:
One form of 'formalist' error may perhaps just be that of thinking
that every step taken by a court is covered by some general rule
conferring in advance the authority to take it, so that its creative
powers are always a form of delegated legislative power. The truth
may be that, when courts settle previously unenvisaged questions
concerning the most fundamental constitutional rules, they get their
authority to decide them accepted after the questions have arisen
and the decision has been given. Here all that succeeds is success.1 85
But Hart was obviously of two minds about the authenticity of this
"success." Indeed, his further comments (following those just cited)
on this issue suggest that "success" may sometimes be illusory:
It is conceivable that the constitutional question at issue may divide
society too fundamentally to permit of its disposition by a judicial
decision. The issues in South Africa concerning the entrenched
clauses of the South Africa Act, 1909, at one time threatened to be
too divisive for legal settlement. But where less vital social issues
are concerned, a very surprising piece of judicial law-making
concerning the very sources of law may be calmly "swallowed".
Where this is so, it will often in retrospect be said, and may genuinely
appear, that there always was an "inherent" power in the courts to
do what they have done. Yet this may be a pious fiction, if the only
evidence for it is the success of what has been done.186
Scenario Five. Building on the preceding scenario and recognizing a
distinction between power and legitimacy, there is the possibility that
183. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 1457 (2001).
184. Fleming, supra note 182, at 375 (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 144-
50 (1961)).
185. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 149 (1961).
186. Id. at 149-50.
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the Court may use its power to achieve a result that is illegitimate, one
that is not, in some sense, in accord with the rule of law, precedents,
or other authority. This is something that Rawls concedes is not at all
inconceivable, at least with respect to the electorate or the legislative
branch.'87 Rawls explains:
Now admittedly, in the long run a strong majority of the electorate
can eventually make the constitution conform to its political will.
This is simply a fact about political power as such. There is no way
around this fact, not even by entrenchment clauses that try to fix
permanently the basic democratic guarantees. No institutional
procedure exists that cannot be abused or distorted to enact statutes
violating basic constitutional democratic principles.' 88
The same reasons, however, arguably apply to the Supreme Court
with equal force, for there is no "institutional procedure" of the Court
that cannot be abused, distorted, or simply ignored. The problem
here, however, is more basic: which Court procedure or precedent is
controlling or even relevant to answering the question whether the
Court should or should not invalidate a procedurally correct and
ratified amendment? The answer may simply be that the Court will
decide how to decide.
Scenario Six. The Court may embrace Professor Dellinger's view'89
that for the 1787 Framers, Article V embodied a domestication of the
right to revolution, the right of the people to alter radically or even
abolish a government they reject. The argument here would say that
the conservative provision of the right of revolution should therefore
be shielded from judicial review and invalidation. Case closed.
Scenario Seven. Finally, the Court may hold that an amendment
repealing the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause
violates fundamental human rights set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and various other human rights
instruments to which the United States is a signatory. The Universal
Declaration, for example, provides in Article I that "[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights... [and] are
endowed with reason and conscience."' 90 Article VI provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law."'' And Article VII states, in relevant part, that all are
entitled to "equal protection of the law."' 9 In light of these "global"
human rights, the Court may hold the amendment invalid as
187. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 239 (noting that the exercise
of political power may conceivably lead to repeal of the First Amendment).
188. Id. at 233.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
190. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
191. Id. art. 6 (emphasis added).
192. Id. art. 7.
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inconsistent with the universal and "higher" law of the United
Nations.
V. RECONCILIATION: A CAUTIOUS EYE ON THE FUTURE
To reconcile Rawls's position on unconstitutional amendments with
the unknown nature of the circumstances of the future, including the
decisions and values of future Americans, it may be helpful to begin
by recalling that Rawls's famous two principles of justice derive from
a more general conception of justice that is captured in one single
principle. Rawls describes that single principle as follows:
All social values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and
the social bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless
an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's
advantage.
193
This general one-principle theory of justice does not divide the
distributive system of justice into two parts, one dealing with the equal
liberties (as Rawls's first principle does), and the other with social and
economic inequalities (as part of Rawls's second principle does). 94
Although this more general one-principle theory would allow even the
basic liberties to be distributed unequally, so long as an unequal
distribution is to everyone's advantage, Rawls's two-principle theory
clearly does not allow such a trade-off of liberty for greater social and
economic advantages. His "difference principle" applies only to social
and economic inequalities.
Now Rawls's claim that his conception of justice (embodied in his
two principles of justice) is "a special case of a more general
conception of justice"' 5 (the one-principle conception) is significant
for the following reasons. First, it suggests that his own theory has as
its source a reasonable approach to justice, although not the one that
he thinks best. Second, this more general theory, while incorporating
a broader "difference principle" that applies even to the basic
liberties, has an implicit element of utilitarianism, for it arguably
stands for the proposition that as long as all citizens are advantaged by
an unequal distribution of basic liberties, justice is satisfied. To be
sure, Rawls offers powerful arguments why this is not the best
solution to the design of just institutions.9 6 Nevertheless, the two
versions of utilitarianism (average and classical utilitarianism) are on
Rawls's list of alternative conceptions of justice available to the
parties in the original position.'97 Putting aside the Egoistic
193. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, § 11, at 54.
194. For a statement of the two principles, see id. at 53.
195. Id. at 54.
196. Id. § 26, at 130; id. § 29, at 153.
197. Id. § 21, at 107.
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conceptions of justice, 98 each of the other alternative conceptions
have merit, or as Rawls says, each "has its assets and liabilities."' 99
Thus, while utilitarianism may not be the best solution to the problem
of choice in the original position, it is one reasonable choice that is
available for consideration.
Now assume that there are circumstances under which the citizens
of a constitutional democracy will be led to endorse a sacrifice of their
liberties for the sake of advantages or necessities that would otherwise
be unavailable. In support of this assumption, it should be noted that
Rawls presented his theory of justice with the proviso that it presumes
a certain level of material development has been reached as a
precondition for its viability.2"' Consistent with that presumption is
the possibility that a society which has satisfied that precondition in
the present may one day suffer a severe setback and no longer be able
to maintain its justice system, including the equal liberties and other
rights which had been successfully guaranteed in the past. From this it
follows that if social and economic conditions should no longer be
favorable to honoring the core constitutional freedoms that Rawls and
others want to protect from repealing amendments, then the People
arguably act reasonably in relinquishing those freedoms in the face of
dire circumstances resulting from war, famine, natural disasters, or
other unknown national and world conditions that may prevail in the
future.
These considerations counsel two sets of distinctions, which are
different ways of highlighting the ambiguity in dealing with the
question of whether or not the Supreme Court should invalidate
amendments to the Constitution that repeal core constitutional
freedoms. First, we must distinguish between ideal and non-ideal
theory, a distinction that Rawls himself makes at the outset of
Theory.2 0' Second, we should distinguish between a view internal to
the Constitution and a view external to it. I take up these distinctions
in turn.
A. Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory
One of the limitations that Rawls imposes on his theory of justice is
the restriction that it is limited to what he calls "ideal theory" or
198. Id. at 108.
199. Id.
200. Id. § 82, at 475 ("The equal liberties can be denied only when it is necessary to
change the quality of civilization so that in due course everyone can enjoy these
freedoms."). The text of the 1971 edition is slightly different. See also id. § 39, at 217.
[I]t may be necessary to forgo part of these freedoms when this is required
to transform a less fortunate society into one in which all the basic liberties
can be fully enjoyed. Under conditions that cannot be changed at present,
there may be no way to institute the effective exercise of these freedoms ....
Id.
201. Id. § 2, at 7-8.
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"strict compliance theory" as opposed to "non-ideal" or "partial
compliance" theory.2 °2 Within ideal theory "[e]veryone is presumed
to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions," whereas
non-ideal theory "studies the principles that govern how we are to
deal with injustice," comprising "such topics as the theory of
punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification of the
various ways of opposing unjust regimes, ranging from civil
disobedience and conscientious objection to militant resistance and
revolution. 23 Rawls's rationale for proceeding in this way recognizes
that "the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and
urgent matters" and that they "are the things we are faced with in
everyday life." But "[t]he reason for beginning with ideal theory is
that it provides.., the only basis for the systematic grasp of these
more pressing problems.21
So stated, non-ideal theory depends upon ideal theory: We cannot
know how to deal with injustice and non-compliance until we have
answered questions concerning the nature of justice. There is a
presumption here that non-ideal theory, including the nature and
extent of partial compliance, will not threaten the viability of ideal
theory. One might say that for Rawls the prevalence of crime and the
breath and nature of war will not be such as to cripple the capacity
and motivation of citizens to abide by the principles of justice.
In other respects, however, ideal theory depends upon non-ideal
theory, at least upon an expanded sense of what is included in non-
ideal theory. Related to and incorporated into ideal theory and its
practicality is an important idea built into the assumptions of the
parties in the original position hypothesis. This idea concerns what
Rawls designates the "circumstances of justice," which refer to the
"normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible
and necessary. "205 Among the objective circumstances Rawls
emphasizes "moderate scarcity," and among the subjective ones
"limited altruism." Thus,
the circumstances of justice obtain whenever persons put forward
conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under
conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances existed
there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice, just as in the
absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no
occasion for physical courage. °6
Now that is a very important statement about what makes justice
possible. If circumstances were different, for example, if either
extreme scarcity or extreme abundance were characteristic of our
202. Id. at 8.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. § 22, at 109.
206. Id. at 110.
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world instead of moderate scarcity, and if altruism were limited almost
to the vanishing point instead of being merely limited, then justice, as
Hume said, "would be an idle ceremonial, and could never possibly
have place in the catalogue of virtues. ' 20 7
Rawls's understanding of 'ideal theory' is therefore partially
founded on a particular set of objective circumstances of the world we
now live in. But of course those circumstances are subject to change,
even radical change, over the course of time. In light of present world
conditions wherein war and great power confrontations have the
potential for causing extraordinary violence and limitless destruction,
it is at least conceivable, more so than at any previous time in world
history, that the circumstances of justice could undergo a radical
change for individual nation-states and for the entire world.
Therefore, under some circumstances the equal liberties could be
abridged, and with good reason, through constitutional amendments
that would otherwise constitute a revolution or breakdown in our
polity. Now this conclusion, as I have already noted, is derivable from
Rawls's theory itself.
The same point of view is reflected in The Law of Peoples,2 °s where
Rawls distinguishes two kinds of non-ideal theory. One kind concerns
the conditions of noncompliance. The second kind "deals with
unfavorable conditions, that is, with the conditions of societies whose
historical, social, and economic circumstances make their achieving a
well-ordered regime... difficult if not impossible. These societies
[Rawls] call[s] burdened ... "209 Of course Rawls is here speaking of
the present circumstances that burden some societies. But there is no
reason why a society, such as ours in the United States, or some other
functioning constitutional democracy that is presently unburdened,
may not become burdened in the near or distant future. Whatever the
cause or causes of the future burden may be-natural, social,
economic, religious, theological, or some combination thereof-the
equal liberties may be restricted or denied by suitable amendments.
B. Views Internal and External to the Constitution
In his argument against constitutional amendments that repeal core
constitutional freedoms, Rawls adopts a view of the Constitution
largely from within the four corners of the document.210 His focus is
on the historical Constitution and the one that we know in terms of
the body of constitutional law that has been elaborated over the
course of our history. With all that as a background, Rawls takes the
207. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in 2 Essays
Moral, Political, and Literary 180 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1898).
208. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
209. Rawls, The Law of Peoples, supra note 11, at 90 (footnote omitted).
210. Those authors who defend substantive limits to constitutional amendments are
similar to Rawls in this respect. See supra Part II.C.
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Constitution and its core values as given and does not consider views
of the Constitution that might be generated by radically changed
circumstances external to it. Given his claims about "constitutional
essentials" in Political Liberalism,2 1 ' Rawls views liberty of conscience,
the right to vote, freedom of thought and association, and other
liberties as among the most important core freedoms. But in light of
the argument in the preceding subsection, Rawls clearly believes that
the constitutional essentials are made possible (when they are) by a
background of circumstances that his theory takes for granted. Given
the constancy of those background circumstances of justice, a
constitutional amendment repealing core constitutional freedoms
would certainly seem to constitute a "breakdown" or "revolution"
from the internal perspective. Indeed, what else could we call it?
Unless the external perspective provides new reasons for radical
change-for a justified departure from our traditions and practices-
then radical changes that repeal those traditions, practices, and values
are irrational, even unthinkable. The internal perspective is therefore
Rawls's presupposition in his opposition to repeal of core
constitutional freedoms. Without radical change in circumstances, a
sudden repeal of those freedoms might lead us reasonably to agree
with Rawls's view that the Supreme Court should declare such
repealing amendments invalid.
However, whenever Rawls concedes that limitations on liberty may
be justified, he tends to contemplate a day when those limits may no
longer be necessary, as when he says in Theory that "[t]he denial of
the equal liberties can be defended only when it is essential to change
the conditions of civilization so that in due course these liberties can
be enjoyed. ' 12 In this sense, Rawls is thinking both within the mode
of the external perspective (outside the Constitution) and within the
realm of ideal theory and the fundamental law. In other words, he is
looking from the unfavorable present toward a better day in the
future when circumstances will eventually allow all the liberties of
ideal theory to be exercised.
The fact that the Constitution has endured for over two centuries,
with only twenty-seven amendments to the original document, should
strike us as an amazing achievement. Those who wrote the
Constitution may have hoped it would endure for centuries and
continue to apply to changing circumstance with flexibility without
compromise of its core values.1 3 Of course, they could see into the
211. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 7, at 227-30.
212. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 4, at 132.
213. Jefferson, however, thought that the Constitution was valid only for one
generation at a time; that "[e]very constitution .. . and every law, naturally expires at
the end of 19 years." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789),
in 15 Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958),
cited in Rubenfeld, supra note 133, at 21.
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future no further than we can today. Yet they made provisions for
change in Article V. Apart from two exceptions-allowing the slave
trade to continue until 1808 and equal representation of the States in
the Senate-Article V, by its terms, left open the possibility of any
change or amendment. No argument for substantive limits can ignore
the plain meaning of Article V's permissive language.1 Of course,
any number of good arguments can be and have been advanced for
why we should continue to maintain the core constitutional principles
and values we have enjoyed for most of our constitutional history.
This is especially true when there are no external factors threatening
the continued exercise of those freedoms. But as Dellinger said,
"arguments about the political wisdom of proposed amendments are
only arguments; they can never be translated into judicial rules of
positive law that confine the ultimate discretion of the proposing
Congress and the ratifying legislatures.,
215
The idea of "constitutional faith" may apply here in some relevant
sense.216 Just as the authors of our Constitution may be said to have
expressed faith in the practical, good sense of future generations of
Americans by not tying them to the convictions of the eighteenth
century, so too we should have faith and trust in our descendants to
deal responsibly with the presently unknown values and circumstances
that will characterize the future.
CONCLUSION
From diverse perspectives, Rawls's opposition to constitutional
amendments that repeal core constitutional freedoms is cogent. His
critique of comprehensive doctrines and his defense of a political
conception of justice offer powerful reasons to oppose repeal of the
First Amendment and the establishment of a religion in its place.
Such a repeal by means of a valid constitutional amendment would
also be in violation of core human rights and deny the basis of equality
that Rawls saw as the foundation of the equal liberties. As long as the
conditions that make the exercise of the equal liberties remain
feasible, Rawls's position makes eminent sense and deserves our
support. But his conclusion that the Supreme Court must declare
amendments that repeal core freedoms invalid is open to considerable
doubt. Rawls's position becomes even more doubtful, however, when
we put aside his ideal and normative theory and recall that his theory
of justice is partially founded on the assumption of circumstances of
justice that are favorable to the exercise of the equal liberties. A
severe change or interruption in those otherwise prevailing
214. See Dow, supra note 69, at 117.
215. Dellinger, supra note 141, at 448.
216. See generally Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988). 1 make no claim
to be using the phrase "constitutional faith" compatibly with Levinson's intentions.
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circumstances may well justify a suspension of the equal liberties,
something Rawls provided for, as we have seen. In general, our
inability to know, understand, and predict the circumstances of the
future should lead us to respect our descendants, just as the authors of
our Constitution appeared to respect us in setting forth the
amendment provisions in Article V. As one defender of substantive
limits to constitutional amendment conceded, even the fullest
commitment to reason "allows only a provisional commitment to
constitutional democracy because we must be open to rational
persuasion about the moral necessity, or at least desirability, of
systemic transformation of the polity."2"7 It is tempting to think that
"constitutional democracy would [thus] allow a transformation to
another system that would enlarge reason's empire or strengthen its
reign. '  But we cannot even be sure of that, lacking the ability to
identify, and the wisdom to know, the endless ways reason may be
enlarged or strengthened.
217. Murphy, supra note 67, at 189 (commenting on a view stated by Sotirios A.
Barber, supra note 114).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
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